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Abstract
Predictable polarization is everywhere. We can often predict the different directions that
people’s opinions—including our own—will shift over time. Empirical studies suggest
that this is so whenever evidence is ambiguous, a fact that’s often thought to demon-
strate human bias or irrationality. It doesn’t. Bayesians will predictably polarize iff their
evidence is ambiguous. And ours often is: the process of cognitive search—searching a
cognitively-accessible space for an item of a particular profile—yields ambiguous evid-
ence that can predictably polarize beliefs, despite being expected to make them more
accurate. In principle, a series of such rational updates could lead to polarization that
is predictable, profound, and persistent. Thus it’s theoretically possible that rational
mechanisms drive predictable polarization. It’s also empirically plausible. I present
a novel experiment confirming the polarizing effect of cognitive search, and then use
models and simulations to show how such ambiguous evidence can help explain two of
the core causes of polarization: confirmation bias and the group polarization effect.
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1. A STANDARD STORY
1 A Standard Story
It was a bench.
“Why was this outside your window?”, my parents asked pointedly.
I wasn’t quick on my feet. I had nothing. So I told them everything: “I’ve been sneaking
out”, I began...
That was when it stopped. That was one in a long line of lucky breaks—for me.
But not for them. My friends were quicker on their feet; their parents slower to see the
problem; their luck sooner to run out.
So we went our separate ways. While I went off to universities in liberal cities, many
of them were stuck in our conservative hometown. While I was having my eyes opened by
higher-education, some of them were fighting for their lives.
I was a near thing, but they made it. Obviously so did I.
Yet this isn’t a story about how a bench changed my life. It’s a story about how a
bench changed my beliefs. So let me ask: what do you think happened to our politics? Who
now worries about far-right militias, and who about Black Lives Matter? Who believes gun
rights should be restricted, and who owns handguns for their own protection? Who voted
for Biden, and who thinks Trump shook things up in a needed way?
I think you can guess.
There’s nothing surprising about that. Most societies display local conformity with global
disunity : people’s attitudes are predictable given their social group, despite varying widely
across such groups (Mcpherson et al. 2001; Brown and Enos 2021). Failed institutions cre-
ate libertarians, universities produce progressives, and the underside of Columbia, Missouri
shapes you in a different way than the academic centers of Cambridge, Massachusetts do.
The result is polarization: people who start out with similar beliefs but set out on dif-
ferent trajectories—like me and my old friends—often come to have disagreements that are
profound, persistent, and predictable (Cohen 2000; Sunstein 2009).
My question is why.
The standard story: predictable polarization is due to epistemic irrationality—the fact
that people’s beliefs are insufficiently constrained by accuracy or evidence.1 Instead, people
glom onto the beliefs of their peers,2 confirm and entrench those beliefs,3 become wildly
overconfident in them,4 and so on. When combined with the informational traps of the
modern internet,5 this story offers a simple explanation of both the ubiquity of polarization
generally, as well as its rise in recent decades (Iyengar et al. 2019; Boxell et al. 2020).
1E.g. Sutherland 1992; Lakoff 1997; Mills 2007; Lilienfeld et al. 2009; Haidt 2012; Klein 2014; Brennan
2016; Achen and Bartels 2017; Bregman 2017; Carmichael 2017; Mercier and Sperber 2017; Lazer et al. 2018;
Pennycook and Rand 2019; Finkel et al. 2020; Klein 2020.
2Myers and Lamm 1976; Isenberg 1986; Baron et al. 1996; Sunstein 2000, 2009; Mcpherson et al. 2001;
Cohen 2003; Pronin 2008; Iyengar et al. 2012; Mäs and Flache 2013, Myers 2012, Ch. 8, Baumgaertner et al.
2016; Brownstein 2016; Mason 2018; Wilkinson 2018; Talisse 2019; Siegel 2021.
3Lord et al. 1979; Frey 1986; Kunda 1990; Nickerson 1998; Jost et al. 2003; Fine 2005; Taber and Lodge
2006; Taber et al. 2009; Kahan et al. 2012; Kahan 2013; Kahan et al. 2017; Kahan 2018; Stanovich 2020.
4Lichtenstein et al. 1982; Harvey 1997; Johnson 2009; Glaser and Weber 2010; Moore et al. 2015; Ortoleva
and Snowberg 2015; van Prooijen and Krouwel 2019; Stone 2019.
5Van Heuvelen 2007; Jamieson and Cappella 2008; Nyhan and Reifler 2010; Pariser 2012; Nguyen 2018;
Sunstein 2017; Vosoughi et al. 2018.
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But notice that this is a story in two parts. First is a series of empirical observa-
tions: people predictably conform to the beliefs of their peers, wind up very confident, etc.
Second is a normative interpretation: if people were rationally constrained by the truth, they
wouldn’t predictably conform to their peers, become so confident, etc. While the empirical
observations are well-supported and widely-accepted, the normative interpretation is not.6
My claim is that it’s false. We can—we should—accept the empirical observations while
denying the normative interpretation.
This isn’t easy. Standard Bayesian assumptions imply that the type of predictable polar-
ization we observe empirically must be irrational (§2). In particular, variations in evidential
standards (Schoenfield 2014; Callahan 2019), background beliefs (Jern et al. 2014; Benoît
and Dubra 2019), or distributions of trust (O’Connor and Weatherall 2018; Pallavicini et al.
2018) do not rationalize the process. This is the best argument for the standard story.
My response will come in three steps. First, I’ll locate a flaw in the standard assumptions
that opens the theoretical possibility of rational, predictable polarization (§2). Second, I’ll
point to a process that shows that this possibility is not merely theoretical (§3). Third,
I’ll argue that such processes play a central role in the psychological mechanisms that drive
real-world polarization (§§4–5). In more detail:
The flaw is that the standard assumptions neglect the fact that some types of evidence
are more ambiguous—harder to know how to interpret—than others (§2). As a result, it’s
possible to face ambiguity-asymmetries that make it easier to recognize evidence pointing
in one direction than another. In such situations, a bias is present—but it is a bias in the
evidence, and thus is one that even rational people would be susceptible to.
The process I’ll point to is a cognitive search (Todd et al. 2012)—searching a cognitively-
accessible space for an item of a particular profile. I’ll show how such processes generate
ambiguity-asymmetries that can lead rational people who start out with the same beliefs
to polarize in ways that are predictable, profound, and persistent (§3). This contradicts
standard approaches to disagreement, which imply that at most one side could rationally
stand their ground.7 Thus, in principle, my friends and I could start out agreeing and all
predict—with arbitrarily high confidence—that rationally responding to our (differing, am-
biguous) evidence would lead me to become liberal, them to become conservative, and none
of us to budge upon realizing what had happened. This all despite the fact that at each stage
in our journeys, we are each rational to expect that updating on our (differing, ambiguous)
evidence will make our (Bayesian) beliefs more accurate. Predictable polarization amounts
to an epistemic form of a diachronic tragedy (Hedden 2015): doing the best we can at each
stage to get accurate beliefs leads, in the long run, to those beliefs predictably splitting apart.
The argument I’ll make is that cognitive search and ambiguous evidence play an im-
portant role in explaining real-world polarization. I’ll present a novel experiment confirming
their polarizing effects (§3.2), and then use models and simulations to show how they can
drive two core causes of polarization: confirmation bias (§4) and the group-polarization ef-
fect (§5). The upshot: if we always searched for flaws in arguments, and if we had no
6See e.g. May 1991; Gigerenzer 1991, 2018; Hoffrage 2004; Taber and Lodge 2006; Kelly 2008; Lord and
Taylor 2009; Jern et al. 2014; Hahn and Harris 2014; Whittlestone 2017; Kinney and Bright 2021.
7E.g. Aumann 1976; Kelly 2005, 2010; Feldman 2007; Christensen 2007; Elga 2007; McGrath 2008; Setiya
2012; Vavova 2014; Matheson 2015; Titelbaum 2015—but see Lasonen-Aarnio 2013.
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self-doubt about our ability to do so, our evidence would be unambiguous and standard
Bayesian models would be right. But since we can’t scrutinize everything—and since we
should have self-doubts—our evidence is systematically ambiguous in a way that leads to
predictable, rational polarization. That’ll complete my (rational) story.
Although this story is built on a series of technical results, those results aren’t needed to
assess the story itself. Thus I’ve partitioned the paper: those interested in the story but not
the technicalities may skip the formal subsections and footnotes without loss of continuity.
But why do I think we need a story like this? Because of what happened to my old
friends—and to me. Because when I try to apply the standard story to us, it doesn’t fit.
Long before we polarized, we could predict that we would: that I’d come to believe that
(say) owning a gun makes you less safe, and they’d come to believe the opposite. Indeed, my
higher-education-based polarization was more predictable than theirs. Perhaps back then I
could blame my future, predictable change-of-mind on irrationality. But now? If I continue
to do so, I’ll akratically believe “Owning a gun makes you less safe, but I believe that for
irrational reasons.” That’s not a rational option (Horowitz 2014). Of course, I could instead
give up my belief about guns—but, by parallel reasoning, I’d have to give up pretty much all
of my political beliefs. That’s also not a rational option. It seems I can’t continue to think
that my polarization was caused by irrationality; so if I continue to believe that irrationality
is the cause, I must believe that they were the irrational ones. But that too seems wrong.
My beliefs have changed even more predictably than theirs have. They were brighter (and
quicker) than I was. Our divergence is due to our circumstances, not ourselves. A slight
change in those, and I’d believe everything they do—there but for a bench go I.
My aim is to tell a story that does justice to all of these features of polarization—its pre-
dictability, its profundity, its persistence, its arbitrariness—without resorting to implausible
claims about the rational superiority of those who, I think, have gotten things right.
2 Predictable Polarization Requires Ambiguity
This project began in an unlikely place. I was working on rational self-doubt—scenarios in
which rational people are unsure whether they’re rational. If you have complicated evidence
or peers who disagree with you about how to interpret it, you might be unsure whether
you’re thinking rationally.8 My aim was to build well-behaved models of such scenarios.
Then Trump got elected.
Like many in liberal bubbles, I was shocked. And like some from conservative towns, I
was embarrassed to realize that I knew no Trump voters. Evidently I had buried my roots
deeper than I’d thought. What had happened to them? What had happened to me?
I became fascinated by polarization, so I set my previous project to one side to start (what
I thought would be) an entirely new one. Pundits blamed polarization on irrationality. But
my old friends hadn’t seemed irrational back then. And my beliefs—which had polarized
more predictably than theirs—did not seem irrational now. So I wondered. To what extent
8E.g. Christensen 2010; Lasonen-Aarnio 2013, 2014, 2015; Horowitz 2014, 2019; Schoenfield 2015, 2018;
Sliwa and Horowitz 2015; Vavova 2016; Carr 2019, 2020; Fraser 2021; see Dorst 2020b for a summary.
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could predictable polarization—in politics, but also academia (Becher and Trowler 2001), sci-
ence (Kuhn 1962), and elsewhere—result from epistemically rational causes, i.e. individuals
trying their best to get to the truth?
That might seem silly. Hasn’t psychology and behavioral economics taught us that
people are systematically irrational? Many think so.9 But many don’t. They critique
the replicability and interpretations of such empirical work,10 and appeal to a burgeoning
research program that uses rational models of cognition to explain the mind’s ability to
routinely perform intractably-complex tasks that the most advanced computers cannot.11
But perhaps this misses the point. Just look at what people believe!12 The world is full
of climate-deniers and vaccine-skeptics (or, from a different reader: police-abolitionists and
socialists). Surely such beliefs must be irrational, right?
Not obviously. Those people have incredibly different background beliefs, networks of
trust, and life experiences (evidence) than you do—and it’s well-known that such differences
can lead approximately- or even ideally-rational people to persistently disagree.
Take me and one of my old friends, Dan. Consider a moment soon after we’d parted
ways—when our opinions had not yet moved substantially, but our trajectories were clear. I
was a few months into studying political science at a liberal university; Dan was a few months
into a job at a bar in rural Missouri. Let ‘π’ rigidly designate the particular probability
function that I had then. Meanwhile, let ‘P ’ be a description13 for the probability function
(whatever it is) that it’d be rational for me to have in 2021.14 Likewise with ‘δ’ and ‘D’ for
Dan. (I’ll be neutral on the interpretation of “rational” opinions like P—think of them as
the opinions that, were I to start thinking about my evidence properly, I’d adopt.)
It’s straightforward to build rational models in which someone is in a position to expect
that our different trajectories of (perhaps misleading) evidence will lead our rational opinions
to polarize. For example, letting s be the claim that owning a gun makes you safer, they
might expect it to be rational for my confidence in s to fall, and Dan’s to rise:
Expected Polarization: Someone’s expectation is that my confidence in s should
drop, and Dan’s should rise.
For some specified probability function ρ: Eρ(P (s)− π(s)) < 0 and Eρ(D(s)− δ(s)) > 0.15
9E.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Kahneman et al. 1982; Kahneman and Tversky 1996; Fine 2005;
Ariely 2008; Hastie and Dawes 2009; Kahneman 2011; Thaler 2015; Mandelbaum 2018.
10E.g. Cohen 1981; Gigerenzer 1991, 2018; Krueger and Massey 2009; Stafford 2015, 2020; Whittlestone
2017; Rizzo and Whitman 2019; Mercier 2020; Cushman 2020.
11E.g. Anderson 1990; Oaksford and Chater 1994, 1998, 2007; Gopnik 1996; Chater and Oaksford 1999;
Tenenbaum and Griffiths 2006; Tenenbaum et al. 2011; Griffiths et al. 2012, 2015; Lieder and Griffiths 2019.
12I’ll focus on polarization in opinions, rather than feelings or behaviors. Though some contest whether
people are polarizing in policy opinions (Fiorina 2016; Mason 2016), it’s clear that they’re polarizing in
political opinions generally—e.g. on claims like owning a gun makes you safer (Murray 2018).
13‘P ’ must be a description—picking out different probability functions in different possibilities—because
it’s an object of uncertainty: I didn’t know what opinions it’d be rational for me to have (see Schervish et al.
2004; Williamson 2008; Dorst 2019; Dorst et al. 2021 for discussion). I’ll use lowercase Greek letters (π, δ,...)
for particular probability functions, and upper-case Romans (P , D,...) for ones that vary across possibilities.
14I’ll model the rational opinions for any given person and time with a unique (White 2005; Horowitz 2013;
Schultheis 2018), precise (White 2009; Schoenfield 2012; Carr 2020) probability function. This allows both
interpersonal (Schoenfield 2014) and intertemporal (Callahan 2019) permissivism—all it assumes is that at a
given time, for a given person there’s only one permissible probability function to adopt. This is a modeling
assumption I make both for tractability and because it makes it harder to demonstrate rational polarization.
15Eρ is the expectation function for ρ, so for any random variable X: Eρ(X) =
∑
t ρ(X = t) · t.
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There are many models of polarization that show that this is possible—that from some
suitable epistemic position (say, someone who knows the workings of the model, or the
evidence Dan and I will each receive), it can be expected that our rational opinions will
move apart.16 Does that settle it?
No. Real-world polarization is starker than that. It’s not just that someone could expect
our polarization—it’s that we ourselves were in a position to expect it. After all, it’s no
secret that failed institutions create libertarians, while universities produce progressives.
More generally, as work on arbitrary-influences on beliefs has made clear, you can often
form clear expectations about the direction your choices and circumstances will push your
beliefs.17 Thus rationalizing polarization requires (at least) showing the possibility of:
Expectable Polarization: Dan and I could both expect that my confidence in s
should rise, and his should drop.
Eπ(P (s)− π(s)) < 0 and Eπ(D(s)− δ(s)) > 0; likewise for Eδ.
Indeed, arguably we must be able to not merely expect such rational shifts (on average), but
to predict them with confidence:
Predictable Polarization: I and Dan could both predict with confidence that my
confidence in s should substantially drop, and his should substantially rise.
π
(
P (s) << π(s)
)




≈ 1; likewise for δ.
And since our disagreements persist upon learning of each others’ opinion, such predictable
polarization would also need to be (rationally) persistent :
Predictable, Persistent Polarization: I and Dan could both predict with confid-
ence that my confidence in s should substantially drop—and his should substantially






∣∣D(s) >> δ(s)) << π(s)) ≈ 1 and π(D(s | P (s) << π(s)) >> δ(s)) ≈ 1; likewise for δ.
This catalogue of types of polarization is ordered by strength—predictable polarization im-
plies expectable polarization (but not vice versa), etc.
Here’s the problem: no extant theory of rational polarization can explain how polarization
is even expectable—let alone predictable or persistent. The reason is simple. Since expectable
polarization requires me to expect that my future rational confidence will be lower than my
current one, it requires a failure of a standard deference principle (van Fraassen 1984):
Reflection: My prior rational confidence must equal my rational expectation of my
future, more-informed rational confidence.
For all q: π(q) = Eπ(P (q)).
In any standard Bayesian model—with P always obtained by conditioning π on the true
cell of a finite partition—Reflection is a theorem, and therefore polarization cannot be ex-
pectable.18 This is intuitive. If at an initial time I could expect that my future, rational,
16E.g. Hegselmann and Krause 2002; Jern et al. 2014; Wilson 2014; O’Connor and Weatherall 2018, 2019;
Pallavicini et al. 2018; Benoît and Dubra 2019; Singer et al. 2019; Nielsen and Stewart 2021; Zollman 2021.
17E.g. Cook 1987; Cohen 2000; White 2010; Schoenfield 2017; Vavova 2018. For empirical work, see
Mcpherson et al. 2001; Kossinets and Watts 2009; Sunstein 2009; Easley and Kleinberg 2010; De Cruz 2017.
18See Kadane et al. 1996; Weisberg 2007; Briggs 2009; Salow 2018 for explanations of this result. Expectable
polarization implies Eπ(P (s)− π(s)) < 0, hence Eπ(P (s)) < Eπ(π(s)) = π(s), violating Reflection.
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more-informed self will be less confident of s, shouldn’t I now lower my confidence in s?
(Shouldn’t I defer to my future-self?) If so, there cannot be a rational divergence between
what I expect my (rational) future-self to believe, and what I now believe. Yet such a di-
vergence is paradigmatic of stories like mine and Dan’s: a few months into my degree, I had
not yet become less confident that owning a gun makes you safer, but I could fully expect
that being at a liberal university would make me so. (In cases like this, I’ll speak of a single
person expectably polarizing.)
Crucial point: it doesn’t matter what I think of the reliability of higher-education. The
fact that my polarization was predictable is enough to show that it cannot have been
rational—at least according to standard Bayesian models, since they imply Reflection.
This isn’t an accident. If rational opinions are modeled with (precise) probabilities,
Reflection follows from two core assumptions about rationality.
The first is what’s known as the Value of Evidence.19 This is the idea that epistemic
rationality must be a guide to belief and action: responding rationally to evidence had better
be expected to lead you to have more accurate beliefs, and to make more fruitful decisions.
(If it didn’t, then you should prefer not to rationally respond to new evidence!) This can be
formalized in a variety of ways: as a ban on the possibility of taking bets that lead to a sure
loss (a ban on “Dutch books”); as a requirement to expect being rational to increase your
accuracy; or as a requirement to expect being rational to lead to better decisions. All three
are equivalent (§2.1 and Appendix A). Say that π values P iff the transition from π to P
meets this Value-of-Evidence constraint. The first assumption is that directly updating your
beliefs from π to P is (epistemically) rational only if π values P .
The second assumption—usually implicit, but entailed by the formalism used—is No
Self-Doubt : if you’ve responded rationally to your evidence, you must be certain that you’ve
done so. Where ‘P ’ is a description for the probability function it’s rational to have, this
is the assumption that, for any claim q, you should be sure how confident you should be in
q: for all q there is a t such that P (P (q) = t) = 1.20
Combining the Value of Evidence with No Self-Doubt entails Reflection (Theorem 2.1,
§2.1), and hence entails that expectable polarization cannot be rational. This is an impossib-
ility result: any theory of rational polarization must either reject one of these assumptions,
or fail to account for the type of predictable polarization we observe empirically.
I know of no account of rational polarization that rejects No Self-Doubt.21 Those that
use standard Bayesian models accept the Value of Evidence, and so can’t account for the fact
that we can expect our own polarization.22 On the other hand, those that do allow for agents
19Ramsey 1990; Blackwell 1953; Savage 1954; Good 1967; see Salow 2020; Dorst et al. 2021 for discussion.
20Any formalism that treats ‘P ’ as a rigid designator for a particular probability function encodes this
assumption, since then P can’t vary across possibilities and so can’t be an object of uncertainty. Similarly, if
P is assumed to be obtained by conditioning a fixed prior on a partition, then this assumption follows. See
Aumann 1999; Samet 1999; Williamson 2008; Elga 2013; Lederman 2015; Dorst 2019; Dorst et al. 2021.
21Salow 2018—which I take much inspiration from—shows that self-doubt can lead to expectable polariz-
ation (cf. Williamson 2000, Ch. 10); but he uses this as an argument for No Self-Doubt.
22This includes Feeney et al. 2000; Dixit and Weibull 2007; Austerweil and Griffiths 2011; Le Mens and
Denrell 2011; Olsson 2013; Acemoglu and Wolitzky 2014; Jern et al. 2014; Cook and Lewandowsky 2016;
Angere and Olsson 2017; Benoît and Dubra 2019; Nimark and Sundaresan 2019; ?; Henderson 2021, and
perhaps Pallavicini et al. 2018.
7
2. PREDICTABLE POLARIZATION REQUIRES AMBIGUITY
to expect their own polarization do so, to the best of my knowledge, by using belief-updates
that violate the Value of Evidence and therefore can be subject to Dutch books.23
What to make of this fact? I think the Value of Evidence is true. I will assume
throughout—with a modification to be introduced in §3—that updating your beliefs dir-
ectly from π to P is rational if and only if π values P . (And I’ll assume that a sequence of
belief-updates is rational iff each individual update in the sequence is valuable.) I assume
this because it provides a bright line between rationality and irrationality: rational updates
are those that you should expect to make you more accurate; irrational ones are those that
you should not. If we cross this line—allowing disvaluable updates to be “rational”—those
inclined towards the standard, irrationalist story of polarization might fairly complain that
we’ve moved the goalposts. For example, several philosophers have argued that allowing
evidence to be permissive—open to multiple rational interpretations—can nullify the force
about arbitrary, predictable-polarizing influences on our beliefs.24 The above result sheds
doubt on this: even if evidence is permissive, expectable shifts between permissible stand-
ards will be expected to make you less accurate. In what sense, then, do they differ from
clearly-irrational forms of (say) confirmation bias or motivated reasoning?
This isn’t conclusive. But it is suggestive. The Value of Evidence is well-motivated; No
Self Doubt is not. In fact, it’s unmotivated. Peruse the psychological literature on polar-
ization. You’ll find that people engage in biased processing—seeing evidence in a way that
favors their prior beliefs—when evidence is ambiguous: mixed, complex, or hard to know how
to interpret.25 You’ll find that these effects are often exacerbated by discussing the evidence
in group settings, where peer (dis)agreements in interpretation have large effects on people’s
subsequent opinions.26 And you’ll find that when the evidence is made easier to interpret
or group norms are altered to encourage constructive disagreement, biased processing and
polarization often disappear (Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Grönlund et al. 2015; Anglin 2019).
In other words: real-world polarization tends to involve ambiguous evidence and peers
who (dis)agree about it. Those are exactly the cases that motivate the literature on rational
self-doubt—the literature that Trump’s election had torn me away from.
What if we take that connection seriously? Hypothesis: evidence is ambiguous when
No Self Doubt is false—that is, when it’s rational to be unsure what beliefs it’s rational to
have in response to that evidence. (For some q and all t, P (P (q) = t) < 1; see §2.1.) More
colloquially: your evidence is ambiguous when it doesn’t wear its verdicts on its sleeve; thus,
in response to it, you should be unsure what you should think.
So-defined, ambiguous evidence can satisfy the Value of Evidence (Geanakoplos 1989;
23E.g. Kadane et al. 1996; Rabin and Schrag 1999; Hegselmann and Krause 2002; DeMarzo et al. 2003;
Halpern 2010; Flache and Macy 2011; Andreoni and Mylovanov 2012; Baliga et al. 2013; Wilson 2014;
Baumgaertner et al. 2016; Proietti 2017; O’Connor and Weatherall 2018; Fryer et al. 2019; Loh and Phelan
2019; Singer et al. 2019; Stone 2020; van der Maas et al. 2020; Weatherall and O’Connor 2020; Zollman 2021.
24E.g. Schoenfield 2014; Podgorski 2016; Simpson 2017; Callahan 2019; Ye 2019; Jackson 2021.
25E.g. Lord et al. 1979; Kunda 1990; Plous 1991; Ditto and Lopez 1992; Liberman and Chaiken 1992;
McHoskey 1995; Kuhn and Lao 1996; Munro and Ditto 1997; Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Klaczynski and
Narasimham 1998; Nickerson 1998; Petty and Wegener 1998; Taber and Lodge 2006; Taber et al. 2009; Corner
et al. 2012; Anglin 2019.
26E.g. Asch 1955; Myers and Bishop 1970; Vinokur and Burstein 1974; Myers 1975; Myers and Lamm
1976; Isenberg 1986; Brown 1986; Brauer et al. 1995; Baron et al. 1996; Sunstein 2000, 2007, 2009; Van Swol
2007; Schkade et al. 2010; Smith and Postmes 2011.
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Dorst et al. 2021). And Theorem 2.2 (§2.1) implies that whenever valuable evidence is
ambiguous in this sense, it can be expectably polarizing. Why? Because whenever evidence
is ambiguous, there is a perspective from which it is asymmetrically ambiguous—it’s easier
to recognize when the evidence favors q than when it tells against it. As a result, it can be
expected that, on average, getting the evidence will warrant more confidence in q.
Combining our theorems, the Value of Evidence implies that ambiguity is necessary and
sufficient for rational expectable polarization. Thus we have both an impossibility and a
possibility proof. Without ambiguous evidence, expectable polarization must be irrational—
hence most accounts of rational polarization fail. But if evidence can be ambiguous—i.e. self-
doubt can be rational—then expectable polarization could be rational.
This is the flaw in the standard assumptions. The rest of the paper will try to make
good on it: I’ll argue that there is a process by which valuable-but-ambiguous evidence can
polarize people in a way that can be predictable and persistent (§3), and that this process
plausibly plays a role in two of the core drivers of real-world polarization (§§4–5).
If you want to get on with that argument, skip to §3; if you want more details, read on.
2.1 The formalities
I’ll consign full formal definitions and proofs to Appendix A.1—but here are the basics.
We can think of a decision problem as a set of options that, if taken, would each lead
to different values at different worlds. π values P iff, for any such decision problem, π’s
expected value of letting P choose an option on its behalf is (weakly) higher than that
of bypassing P and choosing for itself. (π wants to give P power of attorney.) As Dorst
et al. 2021 show, this is equivalent to (1) the claim that π expects P ’s estimates to be more
accurate than its own on every standard (strictly proper) way of measuring accuracy, and
to (2) the claim that no Dutch book can be made against transitioning from π to P (§A.1).
P is ambiguous iff there is a q such that for all t: P (P (q) = t) < 1. So-defined, modeling
evidential ambiguity involves modeling higher-order probabilities—§A.1 explains how.27 The
important thing to remember is that P captures the opinions you should have, not the
ones you do have. Thus having ambiguous evidence is fully compatible with being rational
and knowing what your own opinions are—it simply implies that you don’t know whether
such opinions are rational. You may well know that π captures your actual opinions, in
fact be rational (P = π), but be (rationally) unsure whether your opinions are rational:
π(P = π) < 1. (Recall that since ‘P ’ is a description, it picks out different functions at
different worlds; so it may be that P = π at w while at some w′, P 6= π. Compare: it may
be that Paws is the fastest dog in w while at some w′, Paws is not the fastest dog.)
There are other models of ambiguous evidence. Those that use precise probabilities fall
foul of our impossibility theorem (see footnotes 22 and 23), but some use imprecise probab-
ilities.28 I do not claim ownership of the term—my claim is simply that rational self-doubt
is one sensible model of ambiguity. Moreover, note that (1) standard models of imprecise
27Folk wisdom notwithstanding (Savage 1954; de Finetti 1977), coherent, finite, nontrivial models of higher-
order probability are simple generalizations of the standard models of epistemic logic; see e.g. Aumann 1976;
Gaifman 1988; Samet 2000; Williamson 2000, 2008; Salow 2018; Dorst 2019, 2020a; Das 2020a,b.
28E.g. Levi 1974; Seidenfeld and Wasserman 1993; Joyce 2010; Schoenfield 2012—but see Carr 2020.
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probability fail to respect the value of evidence (Kadane et al. 2008; Bradley and Steele
2016), and (2) imprecise probability on its own will not lead to expectable polarization.29
Given this, here are our (im)possibility results. (All results restricted to finite models; see
§A.1.) First: given the value of evidence, ambiguity is necessary for expectable polarization:
Theorem 2.1. If P is always unambiguous and π values P , then for all q: π(q) = Eπ(P (q)).
An immediate consequence: if at each stage in some sequence of updates it’s valuable for
me to get some new evidence, and that evidence is never ambiguous, then no matter what
evidence I get, expectable polarization could not be rational even in the long run.
Next, our possibility result: given the value of evidence, ambiguity is sufficient for expect-
able polarization. Say that P is valuable iff there is some π that assigns positive probability
to all its realizations and yet values it. Then:
Theorem 2.2. If P is valuable and possibly ambiguous, there are infinitely many π such
that π values P and yet there is a q for which Eπ(P (q)) > π(q).
This implies that expectable polarization can be rational even in the short run. And as I’ll
argue, iterating such expectably-polarizing processes can generate a series of rational steps
that lead to long run polarization that is predictable and persistent.
3 Cognitive Search Polarizes People
In principle, ambiguous evidence could lead to rational expectable polarization—but this
possibility remains entirely abstract. Are there realistic cognitive processes that lead to it?
And can they engender predictable, persistent polarization?
There are—and they can. Consider a word-search task (cf. Elga and Rayo 2020). You’re
given a string of letters and some blanks, and you have a handful of seconds to figure out
whether there’s an (English) word that completes the string. For example:
P A ET
And the answer is... yes, there is a completion. (Hint: what is Mars?) Another:
P G ER
And the answer is... no, there is no (legitimate) completion.
To solve a word-search task, you need to do a cognitive search (Todd et al. 2012). This
is a process in which you search an accessible cognitive-space for an item of a particular
profile—think of searching your memory for an example, searching your reasoning for a flaw,
or searching your lexicon for a word. The crucial feature: it’s easier to recognize that there
is a completion to your search than to recognize that there’s none. To recognize that there
is a completion, all you have to do is find it; to recognize that there’s none, you have to
29In standard models, when imprecise probabilities lead to “dilation”, the future upper- and lower-
probabilities are bounded by the current ones—meaning, for instance, the expected future lower-probability
cannot be higher than the current one. See Seidenfeld 1981; Seidenfeld and Wasserman 1993; Good 1974.
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rule out the possibility that there’s an accessible item that you’ve missed. The former is an
existential task (find an instance); the latter is a universal task (show that there is none).
My claim is that this leads to an asymmetry in how ambiguous your evidence is—and
thus that it can lead to (rational) expectable polarization.
Meet Haley. She’s wondering whether a fair coin, which I just flipped, landed heads. To
give her a chance, I’ll present her with a word-search task, determined by the coin flip: if
the coin landed heads, it’ll be a completable task; if it landed tails, it’ll be uncompletable.
Thus her confidence that the coin lands heads should equal her confidence that the string
is completable. I’ll give her 7 seconds to look at the string, and then she’ll write down how
confident she is that the coin landed heads. She knows all of this.
She’s currently 50% confident it’ll land heads. Nevertheless, I claim that our (and her!)
current estimate for her posterior rational confidence should be higher than 50%—she should
be expectably polarized by the word-search. This doesn’t mean we should be confident she’ll
write down a higher number: sometimes her confidence will go up, other times it’ll go down.
Rather, it means that across many trials like this, we should be confident that the average
of the numbers she should write down will be higher than 50%.
Why? The idea is simple. It’s easier for her to recognize that the string is completable
than to recognize that it’s not. So if the coin lands heads, her confidence that it did should
(on average) increase a lot; if it doesn’t, her confidence that it did should (on average)
decrease a bit—and the average of “increase a lot” and “decrease a bit” is “increase a bit”.
Now in more detail. Say that a string is obvious iff, upon seeing it for 7 seconds, she
should be sure it’s completable. (If she’s unsure, she’s failed to properly use her evidence.)
Some strings are clearly obvious. Witness:
C T
Others are clearly not:
XT M M
Though the string is completable, she’s not irrational for failing to complete it.
If what she learned when she looked at the string was simply whether or not it’s obvious,
her evidence would be unambiguous and so would not be expectably polarizing.30 But that’s
not what she learns. Since it’s easier to tell there’s an obvious word than to tell that there’s
none, she can’t always tell whether it’s obvious. If it is obvious, then (by definition) she’s
in a position to be sure that it is—she should find a completion. But if it’s not obvious,
she may well be unable to be sure it’s not. Staring at EA K, she’s unsure—she hasn’t
found one, but maybe, like EA T, she’s about to realize it’s obvious (‘HEART’ !). In
fact, she’s not, since EA K has no (obvious) completions. But she’s not in a position to be
sure of that after only 7 seconds. All she knows is that she didn’t find a completion within
7 seconds—some evidence that it’s not obvious, but inconclusive: she should still wonder
whether her failure to find one was because she was rational (it wasn’t obvious), or she was
30 If P is updated by conditioning π on the true member of {Obv,¬Obv}, then Eπ(P (q)) =
π(Obv) · Eπ(P (q)|Obv) + π(¬Obv) · Eπ(P (q)|¬Obv) = π(Obv) · π(q|Obv) + π(¬Obv) · π(q|¬Obv) = π(q).
11
3. COGNITIVE SEARCH POLARIZES PEOPLE
irrational (she missed an obvious one). That is: when the string is not obvious, she has
ambiguous evidence—she should be unsure whether she should be sure there’s a completion.
Ambiguous-evidence structures like these are sometimes called “negative access failures”
(see Williamson 2000, Ch. 8; Lasonen-Aarnio 2015; Salow 2018, 2019).31 Though it’s con-
troversial whether they are possible, I think cognitive-search makes a strong case that they
are—§3.1 provides both an argument and some simple models. Nevertheless, since my main
aim is to show what happens if such ambiguous-evidence structures are possible, I’ll move
on to showing why the update is expectably polarizing.
Start with a simple case: suppose she knows that if there’s a completion, it’s obvious.
That means that if the coin lands heads (there’s a completion), she should be able to tell
that it did (she should find one). But if it lands tails (there’s no completion), she can’t be
sure that it did—after all, perhaps there’s an obvious completion that she’s missed. In other
words, it’s easier for her to be rationally confident when the coin lands heads than when the
coin lands tails. Precisely: there’s initially a 50% chance her confidence should rise all the
way to 100%, and a 50% chance it should drop to something greater than 0% (say, to 20%).
Thus the average posterior rational credence that the coin landed heads is greater than 50%
(say, 60%)—higher than her initial confidence. That’s expectable polarization.
Nevertheless, the update is valuable. For notice: the rational opinions are always moving
in the direction of truth. She starts out 50% confident that the coin’ll land heads. When it
does, she should become more confident (100%) that it did; when it doesn’t, she should be-
come less confident (20%) that it did. The evidence is valuable because the rational opinions
shift toward the truth; yet polarization is expectable because these shifts are asymmetric.
The same reasoning applies if she doesn’t know that completable strings will be obvious.
When they are obvious, she should know that they are; but when they aren’t, she should
still (often) leave open that they are; thus she should expect that, on average, the rational
confidence will rise. And since her opinion about whether the string is obvious should always
be shifting (albeit asymmetrically) in the direction of truth, the update is still valuable. (See
§3.1 for models and proofs.)
This explains why the rational opinions for her to have will expectably polarize. But—as
I’ve been at pains to emphasize—her actual opinions may well be irrational. (Whenever
she has self-doubt, she thinks they might be!) Why should we expect her actual opinions—
the numbers she actually writes down—to polarize as well? Because if she’s approximately
rational, the natural hypothesis is that her actual opinions will be some noisy indicator of the
rational ones.32 Since the rational credences are expectably polarized, her actual opinions
thus will be too. (For simplicity, I’ll continue to only explicitly model the rational opinions.)
That’s the theory. How can we test it?
Simple. Meet Thomas. Like Haley, he’s about to see a word-search task. Whether
it’s completable is also determined by the (same) coin toss. But whereas Haley will see a
completable string iff the coin lands heads, Thomas will see a completable string iff the coin
31They are failures of the axiom [P (q) < 1]→ [P (P (q) < 1) = 1]; see §3.1.
32Other hypotheses are possible. Given a model of the rational opinions like those in §3.1, any hypothesis
that meets two conditions will engender expectable polarization on her actual opinions: (1) all she’s certain
of is whether or not she’s found a completion and (2) her actual confidence is always within the span of what
she’s certain the rational confidence might be, but is not always on the extreme edge of that span.
12
3. COGNITIVE SEARCH POLARIZES PEOPLE
lands tails. By exactly parallel reasoning, Thomas’s opinion will expectably polarize in the
opposite direction: he’ll be better at recognizing when the coin lands tails than when it lands
heads; therefore his posterior rational credence in heads will, on average, be lower than 50%.
In fact, it’s time you met the whole room. Half of them are Headsers: like Haley, they’ll
see a completable string iff the coin lands heads. The other half are Tailsers: like Thomas,
they’ll see a completable string iff the coin lands tails.
Headsers should be better at recognizing cases where the coin lands heads; Tailsers should
be better at recognizing cases where the coin lands tails. Thus if the coin lands heads, the
average Headser will be quite confident it did, while the average Tailser will be only somewhat
confident it did. And if doesn’t land heads, the average Headser will be somewhat doubtful
it did, and the average Tailser will be quite doubtful that it did. Since both groups start
out 50% confident in heads, that means everyone can predict that their average opinions will
split apart.
Well—do they?
I’ve tested this in two ways. The fun way: I’ve presented this scenario to my audiences
during a handful of talks. (Indeed, Haley and Thomas were in the first such audience.) In 6
of 7 of them, the average Headser posterior was higher than the average Tailser one.
Second, the rigorous way: I’ve run this experiment properly, finding a statistically signi-
ficant (and large) difference in the two groups’ mean posterior degrees of confidence that the
coin landed heads (Headsers: 57.7%; Tailsers: 36.3%, p < 0.001, d = 1.57). The experiment
also controlled for a confound: it provided evidence that it is the ambiguity of an uncom-
pletable string that drives the polarization, rather than the simple fact that an uncompletable
string provides weaker evidence than a completable one. For details, see §3.2.
Upshot: cognitive search engenders (valuable) ambiguity-asymmetries that can lead real
people to expectably polarize.
What about predictable, persistent polarization? The basic idea is simple: iterate
this process. In the models given in §3.1, the prior estimate for Haley’s posterior rational
credence is about 60%. So if we just repeat with a bunch of independent coins and word-
searches, it seems that we should be able to predict that—since probably about half the
coins will land heads—her average confidence will rise to around 60%. Since the coins are
independent, that implies that she should become confident that around 60% of the coins
landed heads, and hence that she should become very confident that more than half of the
coins landed heads.
But there’s a hitch. Two, actually. The first: Can we just iterate this process, while
respecting the Value of Evidence? Suppose Haley starts out with probability function η, and
then over time the rational opinions for her become H1, then H2,..., then Hn. I’ve been
focusing on showing that the individual updates—-from η to H1, from H1 to H2, etc.—
could be valuable despite being expectably polarizing. But ignore the individual updates for
a second; focus on the beginning and the end. Let h be the claim that more than half of
the coins land heads. If indeed we can rationally iterate this process, then at the beginning
Haley can predict with confidence that the final rational credence function for her will be
confident of h—for example, η(Hn(h) ≥ 0.9) ≥ 0.9. It follows that her initial opinions (η) do
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not value her final opinions (Hn). After all, she’s initially about 50% confident of h; so if she’s
confident that her final opinions will be confident of h, she must expect that almost half the
time, that confidence will be misplaced!33 Thus η doesn’t value Hn. Crucial question: does
it follow that some individual update in this sequence must be irrational—that there is an i
such that Hi doesn’t value Hi+1?
I don’t know. If the evidence were unambiguous, then indeed it would follow. For
ambiguous evidence, that’s an open question. But it turns out we don’t need to settle it.
For there’s a second hitch—and solving the second will also solve the first.
The second hitch: people forget things! In particular, if I actually presented Haley with
a series of 100 word-search tasks, by the end she would start to forget what the beginning
strings were. And here’s an easy theorem: π values P only if it’s certain that P is certain
of everything that π is; if π(q) = 1, then π values P only if π(P (q) = 1) = 1. So if Haley
thinks she might forget something—anything—then she doesn’t value her future opinions.
Does that mean the possibility of rational polarization is sunk?
No. Some things—like Mom’s birthday—are bad to forget; others—like what you ate for
breakfast—are not. The former are questions that you care about being accurate about, and
whose answers are likely to affect what decisions you should make; the latter aren’t.
As stated, the Value of Evidence ignores this distinction: π values P iff for any decision
problem, it prefers to let P make the decision; iff for every question, it expects P to be more
accurate than itself. But that’s a high bar. Most forms of deference are local—you defer
about some questions, but not others (Dorst et al. 2021). You defer to the forecaster about
whether it’ll rain tomorrow, but not about whether your poncho looks cool; you defer to
your future-self (next month) about where you should go on vacation, but not about what
you had for breakfast this morning.
We can weaken the Value of Evidence to make it question-relative in this way. A question
Q is a partition (any partition) of logical space (Hamblin 1976; Roberts 2012)—a way of
dividing possibilities into those that agree on the answer to Q. For example, “Will it rain
tomorrow?” = {Rain,¬Rain}. π values P with respect to Q iff, for any decision whose
outcomes are determined by the answer Q, it prefers to let P decide for it. If so, π also expects
P to be more accurate than itself about any proposition whose truth-value is determined by
Q. (See §3.1 for details.)
What happens if we lower the bar to question-relative Value? It solves our two problems.
Fix the most fine-grained question Q you (should) care about. I claim that if an update
is valuable with respect to Q, then it is a rational update. This permits (some) forgetting.
In particular, if what you forget doesn’t affect your opinions about the question Q you care
about, then it is valuable with respect to Q, and hence is rational.34
33Formally, η values Hn only if η(Hn(q) ≥ t) ≥ s implies η(q) ≥ t · s (Dorst 2020a, Fact 5.5). So if
η(Hn(h) ≥ 0.9) ≥ 0.9, we must have η(h) ≥ 0.81—which we don’t.
34 (Precisely: If π(p) = 1, P (p) < 1, but for all q ∈ Q: π(q) = P (q), then π values P with respect to Q.)
Of course, real people do sometimes forget things that matter, so this is still an idealized model. But what
it allows us to show is that forgetting information about Q is not essential to predictable polarization about
Q. Although there are a variety of models that show how limited memory can lead to polarization (Wilson
2014; Dallmann 2017; Fryer et al. 2019; Loh and Phelan 2019; Singer et al. 2019), so far as I know none of
them allow you polarize about a given question without losing information about that very question.
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And this in turn gives us a way to rationally iterate the word-search tasks.35 Let Q be the
question of how each of the coins land ; imagine this is what Haley should care about. Each
time she is presented with a string, she updates in the way discussed above—this update is
valuable with respect to every question. Then some time later she forgets the string used in
that completion. This forgetting doesn’t affect her opinions about how the coins land, and
so is valuable with respect to Q, and hence is rationally permissible. What it does, however,
is consolidate her self-doubt: although she previously wondered whether a completion was
cognitively accessible, once she forgets the string she knows that she’s no longer in a position
to complete it. Hence although she often has self-doubt upon first seeing each task, that
self-doubt is consolidated by the time the next task comes around—she knows the rational
thing to do (now) is to stick with the opinion she was left with when she forgot what the
string was. Then she’s presented with the next word-search task...
If this is how her memory works, then predictable polarization can be rational. Let h be
the claim that more than half the coins land heads. She starts out about 50% confident of h.
Theorem 3.1 (§3.1) shows that each update in the sequence is valuable with respect to Q =
how each of the coins landed, and yet that—as the number of word-searchs grows—she can
predict with arbitrarily high confidence that, by the end, she should be near-certain that
more than half the coins landed heads: η(h) ≈ 12 , yet η(Hn(h) ≈ 1) ≈ 1. This amounts to
an epistemic form of a diachronic tragedy (Hedden 2015): it is a series of updates, each of
which you should expect to make you more accurate about Q, but which in the long run you
should (initially36) expect to make you less so.
Moreover, if Thomas goes through the Tailser-version of this process in parallel, the
resulting predictable polarization is also persistent : both of them can predict that the other’s
opinions should move in the opposite direction, and hence when they find out what has
happened, their newly-polarized opinions remain extreme (Corollary 3.2, §3.1).
What, intuitively, is happening? Since the (fair) coins are all independent, initially they’re
both 50% confident of h, and are quite confident that roughly half the coins will land heads.
As the process unfolds, there are many tosses (say, Heads1, Heads3, Heads6,...) for which
Haley becomes sure that they landed heads (she finds completions); for the others, the letter-
string was ambiguous, so she has middling degrees of confidence. As a result, her average
confidence in Headsi rises to around 60%. Since she knows the coins are independent, she
must therefore (by the law of large numbers) come to think that it’s very likely that more
than half the coins landed heads.
Of course, she was confident from the outset that her confidence in this would rise. But
so what? She had no idea which Headsi her confidence would rise or fall in; using the only
relevant evidence she has (the word-searches), her confidence has risen a lot in some and fallen
a little in others; as a result, her average confidence has risen. The fact that she initially
expected half the coins to land heads, or that she predicted that her confidence would shift in
something like this way, provides no evidence against Heads1, Heads3, etc. (which she’s sure
35A way, not the way. This section contains no impossibility proofs. There may be ways to iterate the
process without any forgetting—for example, if the salient question changes throughout the process. Indeed,
for all I know there is some way to get predictable polarization with a series of fully valuable updates.
36Unlike a diachronic tragedy in Hedden’s sense, you don’t always prefer to not take the full sequence of
updates—by the end, you’ll be convinced that your posterior is more accurate than your prior.
15
3. COGNITIVE SEARCH POLARIZES PEOPLE
of); nor does it provide any evidence against the other tosses, since they are independent of
each other.37 Thus she finds herself confident that more than half the coins landed heads,
with no way to lower that confidence: she should expect that lowering her confidence in any
of the Headsi would make her less accurate—both about how that coin landed, and overall.
Peeking over her shoulder, she also notices that Thomas is now extremely doubtful that
more than half the coins landed heads. But so what? She predicted that from the outset; it
doesn’t provide substantial evidence against any of the Headsi. So her confidence persists.
Two caveats. If Haley and Thomas knew that they’d both been rational, and knew
exactly what each others’ opinions were, then their disagreement would disappear (Aumann
1976, cf. Lederman 2015). But they don’t know that—Haley doesn’t even know that her
opinion in Heads2 was rational (though it was), never mind that all her opinions were.
Second, there are ways that they can ameliorate their disagreements. If they start sharing
what they did and didn’t find (“I was sure there was a completion on the first toss, was unsure
on the second,...”), this would reduce (though often not eliminate) their disagreement. But
that is an exacting exercise: it takes the patience to talk through (and the ability to recall)
all of the individual bases for their opinion about h. Thus it may well be that Haley and
Thomas are left disagreeing about high-level claims (“most of the coins landed heads”), while
being unable to share all the (rational) reasons they have for their differing opinions.
Upshot: cognitive search provides a mechanism by which predictable, profound, persistent
polarization could indeed be rational.
That means, in principle, we could tell a better story about polarization. For Headsi and
Tailsi substitute bits of evidence for and against the claim that owning a gun makes you
safer. Going off to liberal universities made me a Tailser—made me better at recognizing bits
of evidence against that claim. Staying in a conservative town made Dan a Headser—made
him better at recognizing bits of evidence favoring that claim. Neither of us were made
worse at assessing evidence—we were made better, in asymmetric ways. But as a result, it
may well be that we are left disagreeing about high-level claims (“guns make people safer”),
while being unable to share all the (rational) reasons we have for those differing opinions.
If that were what happened, then both of us could’ve predicted polarization as the
outcome—as we did. And neither of us should be moved now, when we discuss our pro-
found disagreements—as we’re not. Nevertheless, we could both acknowledge that while we
think the other side is wrong, we needn’t think that they are dumb, or foolish, or irrational
to believe what they do—as we don’t.
If that were what happened.
I’m going to argue that it may have—that the example of Haley and Thomas polarizing
as a result of word-search tasks is far more realistic than it seems. We engage in cognitive
search and face ambiguous evidence all the time—and these facts helps to explain the drivers
of real-world polarization. If you’d like to jump to that argument, skip to §4; if you’d like
to see the formal (§3.1) or experimental (§3.2) details of this section’s argument, read on.
37If she could be certain that roughly half the coins would land heads, then she could use this certainty
as a basis for lowering her confidence in the coins she’s not sure of. But she can’t be certain of that—and
indeed, she becomes progressively less confident as she spots more Headsi.
16
3. COGNITIVE SEARCH POLARIZES PEOPLE
3.1 The formalities
Here I’ll (1) argue that the word-search engenders an ambiguity-asymmetry, (2) offer valuable-
but-polarizing models of the word-search task, and (3) explain question-relative Value and
the predictable-polarization result.
(1) Cognitive search engenders ambiguity. Let η be Haley’s prior and H the
posterior rational credence function upon looking at a word-search task for 7 seconds. Recall
that the string is obvious iff she should be sure it’s completable: where c is the claim that it’s
completable, Obv↔ [H(c) = 1]. I claimed that if the string is obvious, she can be sure that
it is; but if it’s not, she should still leave open that it is. The first claim is straightforward;
the second is what requires argument.
The claim is that if the string is not obvious (H(c) < 1), she should still leave open that
it is (H(H(c) = 1) > 0). So it suffices to show that H(H(c) = 1) > 0.
Premise 1: After 7 seconds, she should not be sure there’s no completion: H(c) > 0.
Premise 2: After 7 seconds, conditional on there being a completion, she should leave
open that she’ll find it in another moment. Where C+ is the probability function she will
have 8 seconds after being shown the string, H(C+(c) = 1|c) > 0.
Premise 3: After 7 seconds, conditional on there being a completion and her in fact
finding it after 8 seconds, she should leave open that she should’ve found it in 7 (what she
does do in 8 seconds she, perhaps, can do in 7): H(H(c) = 1 | c&[C+(c) = 1]) > 0.
It follows that she should leave open that she should be sure there’s a word, i.e. leave
open that it’s obvious: H(H(c) = 1) > 0, i.e. H(Obv) > 0.38 Whenever H(c) < 1, that’s a
negative access failure.
(2) Models of the word-search. Figure 1 presents a simple model of the various
possible rational opinions for Haley after looking at her string, in two forms: the left is
a generalized Kripke (or Markov) diagram; the right is stochastic-matrix notation. (See
Appendix A for the formal semantics, and Dorst 2020b; Dorst et al. 2021 for background.)
As indicated by the blue numbers, her prior η assigns 1/2 to the possibility that there’s
no completion, 1/8 to the possibility that there’s a non-obvious completion, and so on. The
posterior rational opinions, H, vary from world to world—they are obtained by conditioning
η on either ¬Find, Obv&¬Find, or Find.39 In particular, if she finds a completion within
7 seconds, she should be certain that she did. If she doesn’t find a completion but there
is an obvious one, she should be certain (she should realize) that she didn’t find one but
that in fact there’s an obvious one.40 And if there’s no completion or it’s not obvious, she
should realize she didn’t find one and be 2/3 confident there’s no completion—but also be
1/6 confident that there’s an obvious completion that she missed. In these (red) possibilities,
38H(H(c) = 1) ≥ H(c&[C+(c) = 1]&[H(c) = 1]) = H(c) ·H(C+(c) = 1 | c) ·H(H(c) = 1 | c&[C+(c) = 1]) > 0.
39Thus the update is not partitional—a common feature of ambiguous evidence. See Geanakoplos 1989;
Williamson 2000, Ch. 10; Williamson 2019; Salow 2018; Dorst 2020a.
40This highlights why we cannot interpret “H” as “the opinions she would’ve had, if she were rational”,
but must instead interpret it as “the opinions her evidence warrants adopting” (Williamson 2000, Ch. 10). If
there’s an obvious completion, then (in some sense) if she had been rational, she would’ve found it, and
so would know that she had. Nevertheless, if she does not in fact find it, then that fact is part of her
evidence—so her evidence warrants being sure of it. Thus the opinions her evidence warrants adopting are
“Arg! Although I didn’t find it within 7 seconds, there was an obvious one.”
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2/3 1/6 1/6 0
2/3 1/6 1/6 0
0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1

Figure 1: Model of a Headser’s rational opinions. Left: Generalized Kripke (Markov) diagram, in which
blue numbers inside circles represent the prior probabilities of those possibilities, and labeled arrows from
circles represent the posterior probabilities in those possibilities. Right: The vector η represents prior
probabilities; the matrix H represents posteriors: row i column j is the probability that, in world i, it’s
rational to assign to being in world j; thus the top row of H says what Haley’s probabilities should be if the
string isn’t completable; the second row says what they should be if it’s completable but not obvious, etc.
she has ambiguous evidence (and a negative access failure), since H(c) < 1, but H(Obv) > 0,
hence H(H(c) = 1) > 0.
Any model with this structure is expectably polarizing on the claim that the string is
obvious.41 (So even if you object to the details, I hope you’ll agree with my point that updates
like this are possible.) In this case, Haley initially is 50% confident there’s a completion, but
her expectation for the future rational confidence is 7/12 ≈ 0.58.42
For simplicity, going forward I’ll coarse-grain models like this by collapsing possibilities
within the “completable, but don’t find” region,43 yielding the model in Figure 2. Think of
this as representing the average rational opinions for Haley to have within the three remaining
classes of possibilities. This model captures the same type of ambiguity-asymmetry (if it’s
completable, she can get unambiguous evidence; if it’s not she can’t), is equally expectably
polarizing, etc.
Why are these updates valuable, despite being expectably-polarizing? The reason is easy
to see in the coarse-grained model: H is more accurate than η on every proposition, in every
world. For example: if the string is not completable, η is 1/2 confident of this while H is 2/3;
if the string is completable but she won’t find it, η is 14 confident of this while H is 2/3, etc.
Accuracy always increases—it just increases asymmetrically : it increases more if the task is
completable than if it’s not. (Similar reasoning applies to Figure 1—see Appendix A.)
(3) Question-relativity and predictable polarization. Let a question Q be a par-
tition of logical space; given a world w, Q(w) is its partition-cell. A proposition p is about
Q iff every complete answer to Q settles the truth-value of p (iff p =
⋃
i qi for qi ∈ Q). A
41Suppose Obv implies H(Obv) = 1, but ¬Obv is consistent with H(Obv) > 0 and so Eη(H(Obv)|¬Obv) > 0.
Then Eη(H(Obv)) = η(Obv)·1 + η(¬Obv)·Eη(H(Obv)|¬Obv) > η(Obv)·1 = η(Obv).
42Eη(H(c)) = 1/2(1/3) + 1/8( 13 ) + 1/8(1) + 1/4(1) = 7/12.
43Thinking of probability functions as vectors, Eη(P |c&¬Find) = 12 (2/3, 1/6, 1/6, 0) +
1
2
(0, 0, 1, 0) =
(1/3, 1/6, 1/2, 0), which—collapsing the middle two possibilities—coarsens to (1/3, 2/3, 0).
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2/3 1/3 01/3 2/3 0
0 0 1

Figure 2: Coarse-grained model of a Headser’s rational opinions, in both (left:) generalized Kripke-model
and (right:) stochastic-matrix notation. See Figure 1 for how to read the diagrams.
decision-problem is about Q iff every answer to Q settles the values of every option in the
decision-problem. π values P with respect to Q iff for every decision problem about Q, π
expects P ’s decision to be better than its own. (See Appendix A.2 for more details.)
Suppose we present Haley with a sequence of n mutually-independent word-search tasks,
using the model from Figure 2. Let Qi be the partition of how the ith task went: Qi =
{N,C, F}, where N is the set of worlds where it’s not completable, C the set where it is but
she doesn’t find a completion, and F the set where she finds a completion. Let Q be the
combination of all the Qi, so that Q settles how each task went (and, in particular, whether
each coin landed heads): for any worlds w,w′, Q(w) = Q(w′) iff for all i, Qi(w) = Qi(w′).
After being presented with each task and forming the resulting rational credence, Haley
then forgets the string. This has the effect of consolidating her higher-order uncertainty: it
holds fixed her opinions in Q, but makes her certain that those opinions are (now) rational.
Her rational opinions at each stage are H0, H0, H1, H1, ...,Hn, Hn. The transitions from
Hi toHi consolidate her higher-order uncertainty while holding her opinions about Q fixed—
they are valuable with respect to Q. The transitions from Hi to Hi+1 look exactly like the
update in Figure 2, Jeffrey-shifting (Jeffrey 1990) her opinions on the Qi partition in different
ways in different worlds, in the way specified by that model. These transitions are valuable
with respect to every question (not just Q).
Letting h be the claim that more than half the coins land heads, this process leads to
predictable polarization (see Appendix A.2 for proof):
Theorem 3.1. There is a sequence of probability functions H0, H0, H1, H1....,Hn, Hn, a
partition Q, and a proposition h =
⋃
i qi (for some qi ∈ Q) such that, as n→∞:
· H0 is (correctly) certain that Hi values Hi+1, for each i;
· H0 is (correctly) certain that Hi values Hi with respect to Q, for each i;
· H0(h) ≈ 12 and H
0(H0(h) ≈ 12) = 1; and yet
· H0(Hn(h) ≈ 1) ≈ 1.
Moreover, adding Thomas the Tailser to the model results in polarization that is also per-
sistent—see Corollary 3.2, Appendix A.2.
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3.2 The experiment
Here I’ll sketch an experiment that both confirmed the that cognitive-search can cause po-
larization, and controlled for a confound in the ambiguity-based explanation of this effect.
(See Appendix B for more details.)
The confound is this. Ambiguous evidence is not the same thing as weak evidence.
Evidence is weak when it shouldn’t move your opinions very much; evidence is ambiguous
when you shouldn’t be sure how weak it is. Evidence can be weak without being ambiguous.
Figure 3 gives an example. Urn A contains one black and one red marble; Urn B contains
two red marbles. I flip a coin, grab Urn A if heads, and Urn B if tails; then I draw a single
marble and reveal it. If I draw a black marble, that’s strong evidence: you should be sure
I’m holding urn A. If I draw a red marble, thats weak evidence: you should slightly boost
your confidence that I’m holding Urn B. But either way, it’s unambiguous evidence. If you
see a black marble, you should know that you should be sure I’m holding Urn A; if you see a
red marble, you should know that you should be 2/3 confident I’m holding urn B. In neither








Figure 3: A case of unambiguous (but sometimes weak) evidence.
So the strong/weak asymmetry is not the same as the unambiguous/ambiguous asym-
metry. In the word-search task, both are present. As I’ve said: if the string is completable,
you can get unambiguous evidence that it is; if it’s not, you can only get ambiguous evidence
that it’s not. But also: if the string is completable, you can get strong evidence that it is; if
it’s not, you can only get weak evidence that it’s not.
My theory predicts that it’s the ambiguity-asymmetry that’s driving the polarization;
but what if it’s the weak/strong asymmetry? Perhaps the reason people polarize is that
they under-react when they see weak evidence: when they don’t find a word, they don’t
move their opinions as much as they ought to.44
The experiment tested this.45 Participants were divided into Headsers and Tailsers.
Headsers sometimes got strong evidence when a coin landed heads, and always got weak
evidence when it landed tails; Tailsers vice versa. There were two conditions. The un-
ambiguous condition saw draws from the Urn task above; the ambiguous condition saw
word-search tasks. My prediction was that the ambiguous condition would polarize, and
that it would do so more than the unambiguous condition.
44There is indeed evidence that (in certain settings) people are conservative Bayesians, meaning they
under-react to some types of evidence (Peterson and Beach 1967; Edwards 1982). But many of these effects
are due to failure to fully believe or understand the experimental setup (Corner et al. 2010; Hahn and Harris
2014)—arguably, a source of ambiguity.
45Detailed report in Appendix B; pre-registration here: https://aspredicted.org/8jg3e.pdf.
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It worked. The plots in Figure 4 show how the average individual’s mean confidence in
heads evolved as they were presented with more tasks. As can easily be seen, the ambiguous
condition polarized,46 and did so significantly more than the unambiguous condition.47 In
addition, Appendix B reviews evidence that it is ambiguity that explains this effect.
Ambiguous Headsers
Ambiguous Tailsers




































Figure 4: Means of participant average confidence in Heads as they saw more tasks, in Ambiguous (left)
and Unambiguous (right) conditions. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
4 Cognitive Search Explains Confirmation Bias
Dan and I weren’t polarized by word-searches. We were polarized by who we talked to, what
we lived through, and how those factors shaped our ways of thinking. Dan fell in with the
libertarian crowd, experienced the unjust failures of educational and criminal institutions,
and became independent and skeptical of many types of authority. I fell out with that crowd
and in with the liberal nerds, experienced the unearned favors of educational and criminal
institutions, and became skeptical of many claims of individual responsibility and autonomy.
Can my rational story explain this? I’m going to make the case that it can: that it is
both theoretically possible and empirically plausible that ambiguous evidence plays a role in
predictable polarization like ours.
Psychologists have documented many mechanisms that predictably polarize people. Con-
firmation bias comprises a variety of tendencies to seek and interpret evidence in a way that
predictably strengthens your prior beliefs (Nickerson 1998; Whittlestone 2017). Motivated
reasoning is the closely-related tendency to subject uncongenial information to especially
high scrutiny (Kunda 1990; Kahan et al. 2017). And the group polarization effect is the
process by which talking with likeminded others (or listening to like-minded sources) tends
to lead you to become more extreme in your opinions (Isenberg 1986; Sunstein 2009).
46One-sided t-test: t(101) = 7.98, p < 0.001, d = 1.577; the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for the
difference in posterior confidence between the two groups was [16.02, 26.82].
47A 2 (Headser vs. Tailser) by 2 (ambiguous vs. unambiguous) ANOVA indicated a main effect of being
a Headser/Tailser (F (1, 224) = 68.99, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.217), a main effect of ambiguity (F (1, 224) = 6.39,
p = 0.012, η2 = 0.020), and—crucially—an interaction effect between the two (F (1, 224) = 21.63, p <
0.001, η2 = 0.068), indicating that the divergence was exacerbated by ambiguity. Moreover, an empirically
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for the difference of differences—i.e. (A-Headsers − A-Tailsers) −
(U-Headsers − U-Tailsers)—was positive ([7.19, 22.59]), indicating that the former difference was larger.
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People who are aware of these predictably-polarizing mechanisms are still subject to
them (Pronin 2008; Lilienfeld et al. 2009). Theorem 2.1 therefore implies that if evidence
is unambiguous, they must be irrational.48 But in this section and the next I’ll argue that
ambiguous evidence is plausibly present in a way that may indeed make them rational.
Confirmation bias first. This effect has been widely cited as a core driver of polarization
in both academic49 and popular50 writings. Nevertheless, many empirical researchers have
noted that we lack good normative standards for assessing its rationality.51 My goal is to
provide those standards.
Confirmation bias is standardly divided into (at least) two tendencies: (1) selective ex-
posure, the tendency to seek evidence that you expect to confirm your preferred hypothesis
(Frey 1986; Hart et al. 2009), and (2) biased assimilation, the tendency to interpret mixed
evidence as supporting your preferred hypothesis (Lord et al. 1979; Taber and Lodge 2006).
I’ll focus on the latter in this section, and come back to the former at the end of §5.
The classic examples of biased assimilation go like this.52 Take two people who strongly
disagree about some claim—say, Dan and I, who disagree about whether owning a gun makes
you safer. Present both of us with two studies: one that (on its face) supports this claim, the
other of which (on its face) tells against it. Give us time to think about them. Since you’ve
given us with the same information, you might hope this will dampen our disagreement.
Generally, it won’t. Instead, people tend to conclude that the congruent study—the one
whose face-value reading supports their prior beliefs—is a more convincing study than the
incongruent one. Thus—on average, across many situations like this—Dan will tend to
increase his confidence that guns make people safer, and I will tend to decrease mine.
Why? It’s not because we’ll simply dismiss or ignore the evidence against our beliefs. To
the contrary: we’ll likely spend more time looking at the details of the incongruent study.
We’ll search for flaws in the methodology, gaps in the reasoning, and alternative explanations
that could explain away the data. And we’ll likely come up with legitimate flaws.53
Thus the mechanism that drives biased assimilation is selective scrutiny : people spend
more time looking for flaws with incongruent evidence than with congruent evidence. And
thus biased assimilation results from the same mechanism that drives motivated reason-
ing54—explaining one will explain both.
Thomas Kelly (2008) argues that selective scrutiny may be rational, and that it may
48And thus that standard Bayesian models—such as Feeney et al. 2000; Austerweil and Griffiths 2011; Le
Mens and Denrell 2011; Jern et al. 2014; Benoît and Dubra 2019—can’t fully rationalize them.
49E.g. Nickerson 1998; Taber and Lodge 2006; Risen and Gilovich 2007; Lilienfeld et al. 2009; Stangor and
Walinga 2014; Kahan et al. 2017; Mercier 2017; Mercier and Sperber 2017; Lazer et al. 2018; Talisse 2019.
50E.g. Gilovich 1991; Fine 2005; Sunstein 2009; Kahneman 2011; Klein 2014, 2020; Wolfers 2014; Carmichael
2017; Robson 2018; Koerth 2019; Rogers 2020; Stanovich 2020.
51Lord et al. 1979; Lord and Taylor 2009; Taber and Lodge 2006; Crupi et al. 2009; Ross 2012; Mercier
2017; Whittlestone 2017.
52Lord et al. 1979 is the classic study, but see also Gilovich 1983; Lord et al. 1984; Plous 1991; Ditto and
Lopez 1992; Liberman and Chaiken 1992; Miller et al. 1993; McHoskey 1995; Schuette and Fazio 1995; Kuhn
and Lao 1996; Klaczynski and Narasimham 1998; Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Munro and Ditto 1997; Taber
and Lodge 2006; Lord and Taylor 2009; Taber et al. 2009; Corner et al. 2012; Ross 2012; Kahan 2013; Jern
et al. 2014; Kahan et al. 2017; Cook and Lewandowsky 2016; Liu 2017; Anglin 2019; Benoît and Dubra 2019.
53See Lord et al. 1979, 1984, Gilovich 1991, Ch. 3, Schuette and Fazio 1995; Kuhn and Lao 1996; Lundgren
and Prislin 1998; Kelly 2008; Lord and Taylor 2009; Kahan et al. 2017; Liu 2017; McWilliams 2019.
54Kunda 1990; Ditto and Lopez 1992; Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Kahan et al. 2012, 2017; Kahan 2013.
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rationalize some types of polarization. After all, it makes sense to spend more of our (limited)
cognitive resources trying to understand surprising findings. If I believe that guns don’t make
people safer, then seeing a study suggesting that they do should surprise me, while seeing
a study suggesting the opposite shouldn’t. Thus it makes sense for me to more thoroughly
scrutinize the former. (And for Dan to more thoroughly scrutinize the latter.)
Now notice: if Dan and I scrutinize different studies, we end up receiving different total
evidence: I know more about one, Dan knows more about the other (Kelly 2008). Thus
selective scrutiny (and therefore biased assimilation and motivated reasoning) seems to a
reduce to a type of selective exposure, namely selective exposure to flaws with incongruent
evidence (cf. Kunda 1990). And if Dan and I aren’t aware that we’re selectively scrutinizing—
all we come away with is, “I saw a congruent study in which I didn’t see a flaw, and an
incongruent one in which I did”—then the resulting polarization may be rational.
But, says Kelly, this only works if we aren’t aware that we’re selectively scrutinizing. If I
know that I’m doing so, then it shouldn’t be too surprising to find a flaw in the incongruent
but not the congruent study (cf. McWilliams 2019). And in fact if I fail to find a flaw in
the incongruent study I should lower my confidence in my prior belief, since this suggests
that the evidence against it is stronger than I thought (McKenzie 2004). This is an instance
of the general point that, without ambiguity, no strategy of evaluating evidence can lead to
expectable polarization (Theorem 2.1; see Salow 2018).
And this is where Kelly and I part ways. After all, many of us do realize we’re engaging
in selective scrutiny. This often touted as standard scientific practice: scientists adopt a
hypothesis and then spend most of their time trying to explain away problems with it (Kuhn
1962; Solomon 1992). Indeed, we are all familiar with the way in which choosing a particular
academic track—whether it’s a graduate school to attend, or a project to pursue—has a
predictable impact on where we will place our argumentative focus, and thus how our beliefs
will evolve (Cook 1987; Cohen 2000). Certainly knowing about selective scrutiny hasn’t
stopped me from predictably polarizing as I’ve carried out my research projects—and I
suspect it hasn’t stopped you from doing the same as you’ve carried out yours.
So our question: How could knowingly searching for flaws lead rational people to predict-
ably polarize?
My answer: the same way that knowingly searching for words can lead them to do so.
Searching for flaws in a study is a form of cognitive search. It’s easier to recognize that
there is a flaw than to recognize that there’s none—the former is an existential task, the
latter is a universal one. Indeed, spotting a flaw can happen at any point, just as spotting
a word—“Aha, ‘EXTREM I SM’ !”—can. Thus if you are not yet sure there’s a flaw, you
should often be unsure whether you should be. And thus if there is a flaw, your confidence
that there is should (on average) increase a lot; but if there is no flaw, your confidence that
there is one should (on average) decrease only a bit.
In short, my claim is that scrutinizing a bit of evidence leads to the same sort of epistemic
structure as our word-search task does (and indeed, that the argument that cognitive search
engenders ambiguity in §3.1 applies equally-well to it). As a result, such scrutiny provides
evidence that is both valuable and yet expectably polarizing. Which way it’s polarizing
depends on what sort of study you’re scrutinizing. If I scrutinize a study suggesting that
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owning a gun makes you safer (s), this expectably lowers the rational confidence in s, since
becoming sure that it contains a flaw would lower my confidence. If Dan scrutinizes a study
suggesting the opposite, that expectably raises the rational confidence in s. (See §4.1 and
Appendix C.1 for details.)
Upshot: if—as Kelly suggests—it can be rational to selectively scrutinize incongruent
studies, then even if you’re aware you’re doing this, the resulting ambiguity-asymmetries will
lead to rational expectable polarization. (As in §3 and §3.1, these updates are fully valuable;
and if we allow for consolidations of higher-order uncertainty that are valuable with respect
to some question Q (for example, whether guns make you safer, or which direction all the
bits of relevant evidence point), this polarization can be predictable and persistent.)
But is it rational to selectively scrutinize incongruent evidence? Wouldn’t it be better to
scrutinize the two sides evenly? If I were deciding for my whole epistemic life, then yes: since
selectively scrutinizing leads to predictable polarization, a strategy that’s (initially) expected
to make me more accurate about s in the long-run would be to evenly scrutinize both sides.
But when I’m presented with a pair of conflicting studies, that’s not what I’m deciding. I’m
not deciding how to invest my cognitive resources over months or years; I’m deciding how
to invest them now (Hedden 2015). Given that, how is it rational for me to decide?
Since both updates are valuable, either way I should expect the evidence it provides to
warrant more accurate opinions (about everything, including whether owning a gun makes
you safer). Because of this, even if I allow blatantly pragmatic considerations to guide my
choice—as some of the literature on motivated reasoning purports to suggest (Kunda 1990;
Kahan et al. 2017; Klein 2020)—the process is still arguably epistemically rational.
But I think often more is true. Why am I often more inclined to scrutinize the incongruent
study? Because I often think it’s more likely that I’ll be able to find a flaw in the incongruent
study—and if I do, I’ll know what to think about it (the evidence becomes unambiguous).
I think this in part because I may think it’s more likely to contain a flaw—but even when I
don’t think that, I still often think I’ll be more likely to find any flaws that may exist.
Why? Because part of being convinced of a claim is learning how to rebut arguments
against it. This very paper can be used to illustrate the point: what put me in a position
to write it was figuring out how to rebut objections to the rationality of polarization—
that it violated Bayesianism (§2), that it was purely theoretical (§3), that ambiguity wasn’t
the driving force (§3.2), and so on. Indeed, there’s both theoretical (Aronowitz 2020) and
empirical (Evans et al. 1983; Kahan et al. 2017) reason to think that people are better at
finding flaws with arguments that tell against their beliefs than those that support them.
Granting this, will polarization result? Here’s an analogy. Suppose I’ll be presented with
a series of pairs of word-search tasks—one following Headser rules, the other following Tailser
rules. At each stage I can choose which task to look at. The twist: the Headser tasks use
British English, while the Tailser ones use American English. Being an American, I expect
to be better at finding words in the latter task than the former. As a result, if at each stage
I’m guided by my desire to form accurate beliefs about how that particular coin landed, I’ll
tend to do the Tailser tasks more often. And since doing so leads to predictable polarization,
I’ll predictably wind up confident that less than half the coins landed heads.
This reasoning is intuitive—but how can we verify it? Simulation. We can randomly
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generate models of cognitive searches for flaws in studies, and examine (1) whether a pref-
erence for accurate beliefs could lead people to selectively scrutinize studies in which they
think they’re more likely to find any flaws that exist, and (2) whether this preference can
indeed lead to predictable polarization. (See §4.1 and Appendix C for details.)
To answer the first question, I randomly generated such models and then measured the
correlation between π(Find|Flaw) and the expected accuracy of the update, finding a robust
correlation (left side of Figure 5). I then generated pairs of such models in which you’re (on
average) more likely to find flaws that exist in the incongruent study than the congruent
study, and recorded what proportion of the time expected accuracy favors scrutinizing the
former. As the right side of Figure 5 shows, as you get better at scrutinizing incongruent
(compared to congruent) studies, the rate of rational selective scrutiny rises quickly.


















































Figure 5: Accuracy and finding flaws. Left: There’s a robust correlation between π(Find|Flaw) and the
expected accuracy of scrutinizing a study. Right: This leads rates of selective scrutiny (y-axis) to grow as
the (average) gap in π(Find|Flaw) between incongruent and congruent studies (x-axis) grows.
To answer the second question, I took two groups of agents who each face a series of
(randomly-generated) choices of which of two studies to scrutinize. They all start out 50%
confident in a target proposition q, and each stage they each scrutinize in the way they
expect will make their beliefs more accurate. The only difference is that one group (red) is
better at recognizing flaws in studies that tell against q, and the other (blue) is better at
recognizing flaws in those that tell in favor of q. The result is polarization (Figure 6).
These results show that the irrationalist interpretations of biased assimilation and mo-
tivated reasoning are too quick: rational people who care about the truth but must manage
ambiguous evidence will exhibit them. In fact, the hypothesized mechanism of these models
fits well with data about a variety of intensifiers and moderators of these effects. It’s built
on the idea that people are better at finding flaws in incongruent than congruent arguments.
They are.55 It predicts that instructions like “don’t be biases” or “try to be accurate” will not
prevent biased assimilation—but that ones that get people to scrutinize both sides equally
will. They do.56 And it suggests that biased assimilation will be more extreme when people
think harder—when they scrutinize more, rather than less. It is.57
55Evans et al. 1983; Petty and Wegener 1998; Mercier and Sperber 2011; Kahan et al. 2012, 2017.
56Koriat et al. 1980; Lord et al. 1984; Schuette and Fazio 1995; Lundgren and Prislin 1998; Liu 2017.
57Fitzpatrick and Eagly 1981; Kuhn and Lao 1996; Downing et al. 1992; Tesser et al. 1995; Kahan 2013.
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Figure 6: Simulation of agents presented with cognitive-search choices, choosing which to scrutinize based
on expected accuracy. Red agents are better at finding flaws in q-opposing studies; blue agents vice versa.
Thin lines are individual agents; thick lines are group averages.
Upshot: Insofar as confirmation bias and motivated reasoning helped drive me and Dan
apart, these results suggest that rational management of ambiguous evidence may have
played an important role.
Nevertheless, these models are built on a difference in our background beliefs and abilities
to find flaws. How could such differences predictably emerge, simply by us falling into
different social circles? If you’d like to move on to that question, skip to §5; if you’d like to
see the details of the argument from this section, read on.
4.1 The formalities
Here I’ll describe some of the details of cognitive-search models; see Appendix C.1 for more.
The model of cognitive search used in these simulations is a generalization of the coarse-
grained model of the word-search task from Figure 2. They have the same structure—a class
of worlds where you find a flaw, a class where you don’t but there is one, and a class where
there is none—but they multiply possibilities within each class to represent situations where
the target proposition (s, that owning a gun makes you safer) is either true or false.
Figure 7 presents an example: I’ve been presented with a study favoring s, currently am
25% confident of it, and am scrutinizing that study for flaws. The si are possibilities where
s is true; the si are ones where it’s false. The prior probabilities, π, are captures by the blue
numbers next to each possibility, while the posteriors are obtained by Jeffrey-shifting π on
the {Find&Flaw,¬Find&Flaw,¬Flaw} partition in the way indicated by the labeled arrows
coming from the circles. Thus the posterior probability for s is: if I find a flaw (top right),
0.05








0.25 ) ≈ 0.233;






0.25 ) ≈ 0.266.
In this model, if the study contains a flaw it’s 20% likely that s is true (π(s|Flaw) = 0.2);
if it doesn’t, it’s 30% likely (π(s|¬Flaw) = 0.3); and it’s equally likely to contain a flaw as to
not (π(Flaw) = 0.5 = π(¬Flaw)). But since it’s easier to recognize that there is a flaw than
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Figure 7: Coarse-grained cognitive-search model of scrutinizing s-supporting evidence
that there’s not, this update leads to expectable polarization.58 For the full details about
cognitive search models, see Appendix C.1.
Two final notes. First, to measure accuracy I used the partitional version of the well-
known Brier score (Brier 1950; Joyce 2009), which takes the model’s partition of possibilities
and calculates the sum of squared distances between the probability of each partition-cell
and its truth-value: the inaccuracy of P at w is B(P,w) =
∑
x∈W (1{x}(w)− Pw(x))2. This
is a measure of inaccuracy, so 1−B(P,w) is our measure of accuracy.
Second, for tractability, the simulations only tracked the agents opinion in s and in
the cognitive-searches they were choosing between at any given time—it did not model
their evolving opinions about all the cognitive-searches they had done. This is a harmless
simplification because a generalization of Theorem 3.1 (which I omit for brevity) guarantees
that when we simulate a series of updates using “small-world” models (like Figure 7)—which
don’t represent propositions about past or future updates—we can always stitch such models
together into a “grand-world” model that captures the (question-relative) value of evidence.
5 Ambiguity Explains Group Polarization
Once Dan and I had different abilities to find flaws in arguments, the cognitive-search mech-
anism described in the last section could predictably pull us apart. But how could ambiguous
evidence start our divergence? The step that made our polarization predictable was when
we fell into different social groups. How could this fact lead rational people who have very
similar beliefs to predictably diverge?
One mechanism is straightforward. Being in different social groups can incentivize doing
different cognitive searches (Kahan et al. 2017; Klein 2020)—when Dan fell in with a crowd of
libertarians, that may have incentivized him to search for flaws in pro-government arguments.
As we’ve seen, this could lead to predictable polarization despite him reasonably expecting
each step in the process to make his beliefs more accurate.
But clearly this isn’t the full explanation. Much of what leads us to polarize is simply
the fact that belonging to different groups affects what arguments and information we see.
58Eπ(P (Flaw)) ≈ 0.583 > 0.5 = π(Flaw), and therefore Eπ(P (s)) ≈ 0.242 < 0.25 = π(s). Nevertheless, the
update is valuable (with respect to every question), just as with our word-search models.
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Groups of libertarians tend to discuss libertarian arguments; groups of liberals tend to discuss
liberal ones; both tend to get their news from sources that are sympathetic to their beliefs;
hence they diverge. This group polarization effect has been widely documented: discussion
amongst likeminded people tends to make them more extreme in their opinions (Myers
and Lamm 1976; Isenberg 1986; Sunstein 2009; Talisse 2019). The central mechanism that
drives this effect is unsurprising: people who believe a claim tend to share more arguments
that favor it than that disfavor it (Toplak and Stanovich 2003; Wolfe and Britt 2008), and
arguments for a given claim tend—on average—to predictably persuade people of it (Vinokur
and Burstein 1974; Burnstein and Vinokur 1977; Petty and Wegener 1998; Stafford 2015).59
This is intuitive enough, so most explanations of the effect stop here.
They shouldn’t. The point from §2 applies once again: it’s not just that someone can
predict that we’ll be persuaded by arguments—it’s that we ourselves can predict it. If you are
open-minded (more on that in a moment), then if you start reading libertarian arguments
every day, you can predict that over the long-run doing so will boost your confidence in
libertarian positions. As we know, Theorem 2.1 implies that if the evidence is unambiguous,
then rational Bayesians could expect no such thing (Salow 2018). Yet we can.
Everyone needs an explanation of this. One possibility is that we expect to be irrational.
But there’s another: perhaps arguments are another source of ambiguity-asymmetries.
Here’s the idea. Suppose you know that someone is about to present you with an argu-
ment for s: the claim that owning a gun makes you safer. Given your background evidence,
that argument will be either good or bad : if it’s good, it’ll warrant increasing your confidence
in s (“Huh, I hadn’t thought of that before”); if it’s bad, it’ll warrant decreasing it (“That’s
the best they can come up with?”). You can’t be certain that the argument will be good—for
if you were, you should already raise your confidence.60 Nor will you necessarily be able to
be certain whether the argument was good or bad after you’ve been presented with it: the
evidence is ambiguous; you can rationally be unsure how you should interpret it. What you
can expect is that the arguer will try to make it easier to recognize the reasons favoring their
position, and harder to recognize the ones disfavoring it. More generally, there’s a selection
effect on arguments: good arguments tend to be made because they are good; bad arguments
tend to be made because they sound good. Since bad arguments don’t tend to wear their
badness on their sleeves, they tend to be more ambiguous, i.e. harder to recognize as bad.
Here’s an (overly) simple example. Suppose Kris was hurt, and your libertarian friend
is trying to convince you that he didn’t have his gun with him at the time. Contrast two
arguments for this claim:
“Every time he went to the North Side, Kris carried a gun. But he got hurt south of
town—so he didn’t have it with him.”
“Every time Kris carried a gun, he went to the North Side. But he got hurt south of
town—so he didn’t have it with him.”
59Some (e.g. Sunstein 2009) suggest that “social comparison”—adopting the opinions of those in our group,
simply because they’re in our group—is also a factor. I set this aside because (1) most agree that arguments
explain more of the effect (Isenberg 1986), and (2) every study I’ve seen supporting social comparison fails
to control for a confound: the opinions of others are a source of evidence (Elga 2007).
60 Although the Value of Evidence allows failures of Reflection, if π values P and is certain that P (s) ≥ t,
then π(s) ≥ t (Dorst 2020a).
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The latter is valid, the former is not (it’s a version of affirming the consequent). Yet—at a
quick glance, or to the untrained eye—it’s easier to recognize that the latter is valid than
that the former is invalid. (That’s part of what makes tempting fallacies tempting.) Indeed,
there’s empirical evidence that people are worse at recognizing fallacies as fallacies than they
are at recognizing validities as validities (Evans et al. 1983, Cariani and Rips 2017, Figure 1).
Suppose this is right, and that it generalizes: at least in many contexts, arguments tend to
be less ambiguous when they’re good than when they’re bad. Here’s a simple model. When
you’re presented with an argument, your confidence that it’s good should (on average) either
increase or decrease. To respect the Value of Evidence, it should (on average) increase when
it’s good, and (on average) decrease when it’s bad. But the degree to which it should do so
is asymmetric: since it’s easier to recognize good arguments than bad ones, your confidence
should increase more when it’s good than it should decrease when it’s bad.
What follows? We can simulate it. If we present two groups of people with different
arguments like this—one (red) group with arguments supporting s, and the other (blue) with
arguments opposing s—then, as Figure 8 shows, they predictably polarize. (See §5.1 and
Appendix C.2 for details.) Thus simply placing me and Dan in different social groups—and
thereby presenting us with different arguments—could lead to our predictable polarization.
















Figure 8: Red agents are presented with random argument models (from Figure 10) favoring s, and blue
agents presented with models favoring ¬s. Thin lines are individual agents; thick lines are group averages.
While this all may seem plausible enough, you may be left wondering how it fits with
my discussion of biased assimilation. After all, if an argument is bad—it contains a flaw—
shouldn’t you be able to find the flaw, and therefore get unambiguous evidence?
This is a good objection; I was stuck on it for an embarrassingly long time. But the
answer is simple: it depends on how you engage with the argument. If you engage passively
(you don’t scrutinize it), the above model makes sense—with nothing but a quick glance,
it’s easier to recognize modus ponens as valid than affirming the consequent as invalid. But
if you engage actively (you do scrutinize it), this transforms your epistemic situation into
a cognitive-search update. On a natural model, this has the effect of breaking the bad -
argument possibilities into two: those in which you find a flaw with it (so get unambiguous
evidence), and those in which you fail to find a flaw (and so still have ambiguous evidence).
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Thus whenever you are presented with an argument, you face a choice: scrutinize it, or
not? Which one you choose affects which direction and to what degree your opinions will
predictably shift. To get a sense for how, imagine that two groups of agents are presented
with arguments favoring s—but one (red) group never scrutinizes them, while the other
(blue) group always does. Although there are a variety of ways to parameterize these models
(see Appendix C.3), natural settings yield the following results (Figure 9). If blue agents
know that they’re not going to find a flaw even if there is one, scrutiny leaves the original
model unchanged and so doesn’t affect the polarizing effects of the arguments (top left). If
they know they are going to find a flaw if there is one, scrutiny removes all ambiguity, turning
the model into a standard-Bayesian one with no expected shifts in opinion (top right). And if
there’s a middling chance of finding a flaw, scrutiny dampens the polarization effect (bottom
left), and can even lead to polarization in the opposite direction (bottom right).
































































Figure 9: Two groups presented with arguments favoring q; red group never scrutinizes, blue group always
does. Top Left: 0% chance of finding flaw, if there is one; full polarization. Top Right: 100% chance of
finding flaw, if there is one; no polarization. Bottom: Middling chance of finding flaw if there is one, with
small (left) and large (right) amounts of ambiguity if not—can dampen (left) or reverse (right) polarization.
Upshot: if we always scrutinized arguments and had no self-doubt about our ability to
find their flaws, then our evidence would be unambiguous and we would not be predictably
persuaded—standard Bayesian models would be right; predictable polarization would be
irrational. But since we can’t scrutinize everything—and even if we could, we should still
have self-doubts—arguments can rationally, predictably polarize us.
These results show that irrationalist interpretations of the group polarization effect are
too quick: people who rationally expect the arguments they’re seeing to make their beliefs
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more accurate can nevertheless, over the long run, be predictably polarized by them.
Indeed, this model of how this happens—especially when supplemented with the hypo-
thesis (§4) that people are more likely to scrutinize incongruent than congruent arguments—
fits well with a variety of findings from the literature on persuasion. It predicts that there
are two routes to engaging with arguments: a passive, low-effort one that moves opinions in
a predictable direction; and an active, high-effort one in which the persuasive effects depend
massively on the details. There are.61 It predicts that people presented with arguments that
oppose their beliefs will react differently depending on how they engage with them—and that
those who are better at finding flaws may well end up with a more biased assessment of the
overall weight of evidence. They do.62 And it predicts that manipulating how much scrutiny
people give to arguments will have large effects on persuasion—with the biggest effects being
on the evaluation of weak, congruent arguments (they’ll be surprised to find flaws) and of
strong, incongruent arguments (they’ll be surprised not to find flaws). It does.63
Finally, this model might help make sense of the mixed findings surrounding selective
exposure (§4)—the tendency to prefer to look at congruent arguments over incongruent
ones. Sometimes people do this (Fischer et al. 2005; Taber and Lodge 2006); other times
they don’t (Sears and Freedman 1967; Whittlestone 2017). Why? One through-line seems
to be that people are more inclined to engage in selective exposure when they expect the
arguments to be of high quality (i.e. not to contain obvious flaws), and less inclined otherwise
(Frey 1986; Hart et al. 2009). The above model predicts this. When arguments are strong,
scrutiny is useless (you don’t think you’ll be able to find a flaw even if there is one); so
deciding which argument to look at is just a comparison of simple argument models. In that
case, avoiding ambiguity will drive you to look at the argument you think is more likely to
be good—generally, the one that supports your beliefs, leading to selective exposure. But
when arguments aren’t strong, scrutiny matters (you expect to find flaws); thus avoiding
ambiguity will spur you to look at the arguments you think you’re most likely to find a flaw
in—often the incongruent arguments, contra the selective exposure effect.
Much remains to be done. These speculative empirical remarks should be backed up with
quantitative studies; these simple theoretical models should be further refined. Nevertheless,
what we’ve seen so far this suffices to show that many of the empirically-observed predictably-
polarizing effects—including the ones that drove me and Dan apart—are to be expected from
rational people who care about the truth but face ambiguous evidence.
5.1 The formalities
Here I’ll sketch the models of arguments and scrutiny; see Appendices C.2 and C.3 for more.
The simple model of arguments divides possibilities into those in which the argument
is good (G) and those in which it’s bad (B). You start out with some prior degree of
confidence in each of these. Whichever it is, the posterior rational credence is obtained by
Jeffrey-shifting on the {G,B} partition—increasing confidence in the true possibility, thus
increasing accuracy and satisfying the Value of Evidence. However the degree of these shifts
61Petty 1994; Petty and Wegener 1998; Taber and Lodge 2006; Lundgren and Prislin 1998.
62Kahan et al. 2012; Kahan 2013; Kahan et al. 2017; Bail et al. 2018.
63Schuette and Fazio 1995; Petty and Wegener 1998; Liu 2017.
31
6. A BETTER STORY
is asymmetric: since good arguments are easier to recognize, the shift is larger if G than
if B. This model is summarized in Figure 10. (For example, if π(s) = 0.5, π(G) = 0.5,
π(s|G) = 0.6, π(s|B) = 0.4, and x = 0.4 > 0.1 = y, then Eπ(P (G)) = 0.65 > 0.5 = π(G) and
so Eπ(P (s)) = 0.53 > 0.5 = π(s).)
Good (G) Bad (B)




Figure 10: Schematic model of an argument. If it’s an argument for s, then π(s|G) > π(s) > π(s|B); for
¬s, vice versa. Since bad arguments are more ambiguous than good ones, y ≤ x.
What about scrutiny? Given an argument-model, the agent chooses whether to update
in accordance with it, or instead transform the update by splitting the Bad possibilities into
those in which they do vs. do not find a flaw in the argument, as diagrammed schematically
(without labeled arrows) in Figure 11. There are a variety choices that must be made about
the parameters of these models; see §C.3 for details.
Don’t Scrutinize:





Good (G) Bad (B)
Find
Figure 11: Schematic model of the choice of whether to scrutinize an argument.
6 A Better Story
Not long ago, I caught up with an old friend. Not Dan. A better friend. A friend who was
with me that night we left something outside my window. A friend whose story is his own.
We talked about old times. Alec and Kris; history class and lifeguarding; those nights
by the lake—and that god-damned bench.
We talked about our lives. How mine has disappeared into academia—finding my passion
so quickly, but losing my roots so thoroughly. How his had nearly fallen apart—but then
how he’d gotten himself out, gotten it together, gotten it back.
We talked about politics. About Trump and Biden; about Covid and vaccines; about
race and politics; about police and guns.
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The details were stunning. But the outlines? Predictable. We weren’t surprised by each
others’ opinions; most of them, we could’ve guessed. That said, his reasons surprised me. I
didn’t agree with them—with selective scrutiny, I concluded that some were misinformation,
and many were missing the bigger picture. But what they made clear was how—with his
networks of trust, his lived experience, and his (ambiguous) evidence—a person just as bright
and well-meaning as I could be led, predictably, to such a different place.
That night, I realized something: I finally believed my own story. You see, the progression
of this paper has mirrored the progression of this project. It began as a “flashy” research
program: abstract models of rationality made a prediction from pure theory that was borne
out by empirical psychology—predictable polarization could result from ambiguous evid-
ence (§2). Though interesting, this was purely theoretical. I eventually managed to turn this
result into a concrete example—a word-search task—that both polarized real people, and
demonstrated a possibility that many thought impossible: a series of locally optimal steps
toward the truth could lead, predictably, to profound and persistent shifts away from it (§3).
It started to look like a promising direction—but there were obstacles. If it were correct, the
crucial feature had to be asymmetries in ambiguity (rather than strength) of evidence; so I
did an experiment, and found that indeed it was (§3.2). Yet if this was to be an empirically-
relevant framework, this had to move outside the lab—the real-world causes of polarization
would have to be explicable in terms of evidential ambiguity. So I dove into the literatures
on confirmation bias (§4) and group polarization (§5)—and I found that indeed they were.
Then—finally—I got ahold of that friend. And—finally—I believed it. This was no longer
just a flashy research program or an interesting theoretical idea or a promising research dir-
ection. It was, maybe, true: in the face of ambiguous evidence and self-doubt, concern for the
truth might predictably lead rational people apart. And if it were true, it mattered: for how
we think about our political opponents, and ourselves; for understanding society’s polarized
mix of local conformity with global disunity; and—maybe—for trying to fix it.
There’s much more to the story of how I became convinced—blind alleys I won’t bother
sharing, and promising directions that, here, I can’t. And I know that you probably aren’t
yet convinced. You shouldn’t be! (Much remains to be done.) But my hope is that by
walking you down this road I’ve been on, I’ve at least gotten you to where I began: seeing
the ambiguous-evidence theory of rational polarization as an interesting theoretical idea, a
promising research direction, and the sort of framework that might bring a useful normative
yardstick to the vast empirical literature on predictable polarization.
Of course, you may be skeptical of Dan’s rationality—or of mine. Indeed, I just told you
a less-than-fully-objective story about how I predictably became convinced of the rationality
of my old friends.
But hold on. Why should that make you skeptical? Four years ago, with an open
mind I began a project arguing that predictable polarization could be rational. Predictably,
I’ve been convinced that it can be. The processes that convinced me were the ones that
drive polarization generally: discussions with those sympathetic to my position; scrutiny of
objections from the opposing side; and a search for evidence that confirmed my hypothesis.
So if you’re skeptical of my rationality—or of Dan’s—presumably that’s because you buy
the standard story that such processes are irrational.
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Should you? Notice that there’s an asymmetry between my story and the alternative.
The position I end up with is coherent: “Predictable polarization is rational, and I myself
came to believe that through rational polarizing mechanisms”—in short, “p, and I’m rational
to believe that p”. In contrast, imagine if my story had the opposite conclusion: I had
started with an open mind on a project arguing for the irrationality of polarization, and
had predictably become convinced. Then my position would be incoherent: “Predictable
polarization is irrational, and I myself came to believe that through irrational polarizing
mechanisms”—in short, “p, but I’m irrational to believe that p”. This in an epistemically
akratic state—one that both common sense (Horowitz 2014) and the Value of Evidence
(Dorst 2020a) imply must be irrational. (If you rationally believe that you’re not rational
to believe p, you can’t also rationally believe that p.) Upshot: I couldn’t coherently tell the
same story with the opposite conclusion.
Now notice: the exact same asymmetry applies to you. Take any one of your beliefs—
about religion, politics, philosophy, etc.—that, in hindsight, you recognize as formed by the
predictably-polarizing mechanisms we’ve discussed. Perhaps you were raised in a religious
household, or went to a liberal university, or worked for a long time on a project arguing
for a particular conclusion. Regardless: if you buy the standard story that predictably-
polarizing processes are irrational, you’re in trouble—for if you don’t give up your own belief,
you’ll incoherently believe “p, but I’ve come to believe that through irrational polarizing
mechanisms”. In contrast: if you buy my story, you can acknowledge all the features of
your belief—its predictability, its profundity, its persistence, it’s arbitrariness—while still
coherently maintaining it.
That, presumably, is something you’d like.
Well, it’s yours for the taking. Read my arguments with an open mind; engage in selective
scrutiny on my behalf; discuss these ideas with those who are sympathetic to them; and you
too can become predictably—and rationally!—convinced of rational polarization.64
64Far too many people have helped me with this project for me to properly thank all of them. I received
helpful feedback from audiences at MIT, the Prindle Institute for Ethics, Indiana University, the University
of Pittsburgh, the National University of Singapore, the 2019 Pacific APA, the University of Oxford, the
University of Missouri, the Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science, and the University of Lisbon.
Bernhard Salow, Jack Spencer, Dmitri Gallow, Roger White, Sally Haslanger, Caspar Hare, Kieran Setiya,
and Bob Stalnaker each played a formative role at the start of this project. I received helpful feedback
along the way from Martina Calderisi, Agnes Callard, Chris Dorst, Rachel Fraser, Peter Gerdes, Dan Greco,
Brian Hedden, Jay Hodges, Michael Hannon, Harvey Lederman, Annina Loets, Matt Mandelkern, Travis
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many anonymous blog- and social-media commenters. Special thanks to Liam Kofi Bright, Thomas Byrne,
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This appendix contains the model theory for the higher-order probabilities and ambiguous
evidence used throughout, as well as proofs of all theorems.
A.1 Higher-order probability, Value, and Theorems 2.1 and 2.2
Following the practice of standard epistemic logic (Hintikka 1962; van Ditmarsch et al.
2015), we give a semantics for higher-order probability by using a (finite) structure that can
identify higher-order claims (of any order) with events, i.e. sets of worlds, i.e. propositions. A
probability frame 〈W, {P i}i∈N 〉 consists of a (finite) set of worldsW and a set of functions
P i from worlds w ∈ W to probability functions P iw defined over all subsets of W , so that
P i : W → ∆(W ). Thus ‘P i’ can be thought of as a description of a probability function—it
picks out different such functions in different worlds. In our case, it’ll always be interpreted
as ‘the rational credence function (for some particular agent) at some particular time i’.
Note that ‘P iw’ is a rigid designator that picks out the (unique) probability function that P i
associates with a given world w. In cases where we’re only concerned about one description
of a probability function, I’ll drop the index and use P , Pw, etc. In addition, I’ll often
enrich the structure of a probability frame with one or more (rigidly designated) probability
functions, denoted π, δ, ρ, η,....65
W is used to represent the propositions in the frame, so for any p, q ⊆ W , p is true at
w iff w ∈ p; ¬p = W \ p, p ∧ q = p ∩ q, p → q = ¬p ∪ q etc. All theorems are restricted to
models with finite W—it’s an open and interesting question how far they generalize.
We use P to identify facts about probabilities as sets of worlds in the frame, thus allowing
us to ‘unravel’ higher-order probability claims to be sets of worlds. Thus for any q ⊆ W
and t ∈ R, and π ∈ ∆(W ): [P (q) = t] := {w ∈ W : Pw(q) = t}, [P (q|r) ≥ t] := {w ∈ W :
Pw(q|r) ≥ t}, [P = π] := {w ∈W : Pw = π}, etc.
Say that P is possibly ambiguous iff at some world it has higher-order uncertainty, iff
there is a world w and proposition q such that for all t: Pw(P (q) = t) < 1; iff there are two
probability functions π 6= ρ such that Pw(P = π) > 0 and Pw(P = ρ) > 0. Since W is finite,
we can think of a probability function just as an assignment of non-negative numbers that
sum to 1 to the various worlds. Thus we can diagram probability frames as we did in the
main text using Markov diagrams: nodes represent states, and an arrow labeled t from node
x to node y represents that Px(y) = t. For example, Figure 12 represents an unambiguous
frame, since the two classes of probability functions (left and right) in the frame do not
assign any probability to each other. Meanwhile, Figure 13 represents an ambiguous frame,
wherein the left class assigns 0.4 to the right one, and the right one assigns 0.2 to the left
one.
65For more uses of (structures like) probability frames, see Gaifman 1988; Samet 2000; Williamson 2000,
2014, 2019; Schervish et al. 2004; Lasonen-Aarnio 2013, 2015; Campbell-Moore 2016; Salow 2018, 2019; Das
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P = η P = δ
Figure 13: An ambiguous frame. η assigns 0.3 to a, to b, and to c, and 0.1 to d; δ assigns 0.1 to a and to
b, 0.6 to c, and 0.2 to d. Thus η(P = η) = 0.6 and η(P = δ) = 0.4, while δ(P = η) = 0.2 and δ(P = δ) = 0.8.
When is a transition from an initial probability function π, to a posterior P—updating
to different probabilities Pw in different worlds w—a rational update? If you should expect
it to lead you to make better decisions, no matter what decision you face, then I claimed
it is. We can formalize this as follows (following Dorst et al. 2021). Given a probability
frame 〈W,P 〉, let an option O be a function from worlds w to numbers O(w) (so options are
random variables), representing the utility that would be achieved by taking option O at w.
Let a decision problem be a finite set of options O. Let a strategy S be a way of choosing
options based on P ’s probabilities, i.e. a function from w to Sw ∈ O such that Sw = Sx
whenever Pw = Px. P recommends a strategy S for O iff S always selects an option that
maximizes expected value according to P . Recalling that Eπ(O) =
∑
t∈R π(O = t) · t is the
expected value of option O according to π, a strategy is recommended by P iff for all w and
O ∈ O: EPw(Sw) ≥ EPw(O). Then π values P iff, for every decision problem, the expected
value of following a strategy recommended by P is at least as high as taking the option that
maximizes expected value according to π. Abusing notation slightly so that Eπ(S) is the
expected value of following a strategy S, i.e. Eπ(S) :=
∑
w π(w)Sw(w), that is:
Value: π values P iff ∀O: if P recommends S for O, then ∀O ∈ O: Eπ(S) ≥ Eπ(O).
π values P iff, for any decision problem, π prefers to let P decide on π’s behalf, rather
than make the decision itself.
Dorst et al. 2021 argue that Value is what it takes for π to defer to P , and give a charac-
terization of what this amounts to (Theorem 5.2). For our purposes, the relevant points are
that π values P iff no (fixed-option66) Dutch book can be constructed for updating from
π to P (i.e. the transition cannot be made to lead to a sure loss), iff on every generally
66A fixed-option Dutch book is one in which options are random variables as above, and thus a situation
in which you have the same options at every world. See Dorst et al. 2021, §1.
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strictly proper67 way of measuring the accuracy of estimates (Schervish 1989; Levinstein
2020; Campbell-Moore 2020), π expects P to be more accurate than itself.
It’ll expedite the results below to appeal to the details of one part of their characterization.
Given a function Pw that perhaps has higher-order uncertainty (so that Pw(P = Pw) < 1),
we can considered it’s informed version P̂w which removes this higher-order uncertainty,
i.e. P̂w := Pw(·|P = Pw) (Elga 2013; Stalnaker 2019; Dorst 2019). For example, informing η
and δ in Figure 13 would generate the frame in Figure 12, since η̂ = η(·|P = η) = η(·|{a, b}) =
π and likewise δ̂ = ρ.
Now think of a probability function π over a set W of size |W | = n as a point in
Euclidean n-space, i.e. a vector in which entry i is π(wi). The convex hull of a set of such
probability functions π1, .., πn is the set of points obtainable by averaging them; formally,
CH{π1, ..., πn} = {δ : ∃λi ≥ 0 and
∑
λi = 1 such that δ =
∑
λiπi}. Let Cw = {ρ :
Pw(P = ρ) > 0} be the set of candidate probability functions that Pw thinks might be P , and
C−w = Cw−{Pw} be the set of such functions other than Pw. Then say that Pw is modestly
informed iff it is an average of its informed self P̂w along with the other candidates C−w ,
i.e. iff Pw is in the convex hull of {P̂w} ∪C−w . Finally let Cπ = {Pw : π(P = Pw) > 0} be the
set of candidates that π leaves open might be P . Then we have:
Theorem A.1. π values P iff each Pw in Cπ is modestly informed, and π is in the convex
hull of Cπ.
With this result we can easily prove our Theorems 2.1 and 2.2 that ambiguity is necessary
and sufficient for expectable polarization.
Theorem 2.1. If P is always unambiguous and π values P , then for all q: π(q) = Eπ(P (q)).
Proof. If π values P , then each Pw ∈ Cπ is modestly informed and π is in their convex
hull. This implies that for any Pw ∈ Cπ, Pw(P = Pw) > 0 (Dorst et al. 2021, Lemma 7.2.5).
If P is unambiguous, then each Pw is certain of what P is, and since Pw(P = Pw) > 0,
it follows that Pw(P = Pw) = 1. Since π is in the convex hull of the Pw, it follows that






= Pw(q|P = Pw) = Pw(q), where the
third and final equalities comes from the fact that for all i, Pi(P = Pi) = 1.) It follows












π(P = Pw)Eπ(P (q) |P = Pw) = Eπ(P (q)) (Total expectation)
67A proper scoring rule is one such that every (rigidly designated) probability function expects itself to be
at least as accurate as any other. They are the standard ways of measuring (in)accuracy—see e.g. Schervish
1989; Pettigrew 2016; Campbell-Moore 2020; Campbell-Moore and Levinstein 2020; Levinstein 2020.
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Recall that we say that P is valuable iff there is some ρ that values it while also leaving
open all its potential realizations, i.e. for all w ∈W : ρ(P = Pw) > 0. Then:
Theorem 2.2. If P is valuable and possibly ambiguous, there are infinitely many π such
that π values P and yet there is a q for which Eπ(P (q)) > π(q).
Proof. Let ρ1, ..., ρn be the potential realizations of P , so Cπ = {ρ1, ..., ρn}. We know that
each ρi is modestly informed, and that π is in their convex hull.
We begin by showing that there is a q ⊆W and a ρi such that ρi(q) 6= Eρi(P (q)), following
Samet 2000, Theorem 5. For reductio, suppose that for all ρi and q, ρi(q) = Eρi(P (q)).
Note that P can be viewed as a finite Markov chain with W the state space and Pw(w′) the
probability of transitioning from w to w′. As such, we can partitionW into its communicating
classes E1, ..., Ek, plus perhaps a set of transient states E0. The claim that, for all q,
ρi(q) = Ei(P (q)) is equivalent to the claim that ρi is a stationary distribution with respect
to the Markov chain, i.e. where M is the transition matrix and ρi is thought of as the (row)
vector with the ρi(w) in each column, ρiM = ρi. By the Markov chain convergence theorem,
each E1, ...Ek has a unique stationary distribution, and every stationary of M assigns 0
probability to E0. These imply, first, that π(E0) = 0, for otherwise π would not be in
the convex hull of the (stationary) ρi. Since Cπ includes all realizations of P , this implies
that E0 is empty. Moreover, the fact that each Ei has a unique stationary, combined with
our assumption that all ρi(·) = Eρi(P (·)) implies that for any w,w′ ∈ Ei, Pw = Pw′ and
(since Ei is a communicating class) Pw(Ei) = 1, which implies that P is not ambiguous after
all—contradiction.
Thus we know that there is a ρi and q such that ρi(q) 6= Eρi(P (q)). Since ρi(q) < Eρi(P (q))
iff π(¬q) > Eρi(P (¬q)), WLOG assume ρi(q) < Eρi(P (q)). Equivalently, where 1q is the
indicator function of q (1 at w ∈ q, 0 elsewhere), Eρi(P (q)− 1q) > 0. We want to show
that there are uncountably many δ such that δ values P and yet Eδ(P (q)− 1q) > 0. Pick
some ρi that maximizes Eρi(P (q)− 1q) within the frame (the frame is finite, so there is
one), and any other ρj 6= ρi (there must be at least one other, since P is ambiguous).
Now for any ε ∈ [0, 1], letting ηε := (1 − ε)ρi + ερj , and thinking of Eηε(P (q)− 1q) as a
function of ε, notice that this function is continuous and non-increasing in ε, with maximum
Eρi(P (q)− 1q) > 0 and minimum Eρj (P (q)− 1q). By the intermediate value theorem, this
function must hit every value in between the two—meaning there are uncountably many
values of ε such that Eηε(P (q)− 1q) > 0. Since each one of these ηε are distinct (since
ρi 6= ρj), and they are all in the convex hull of Cπ (since ρi, ρj ∈ Cπ), they all value P
despite having ηε(q) < Eηε(P (q)).
A.2 Word-searches, question-relativity, and iteration
In this subsection, I’ll first show that our two simple word-search models (from §3) are
valuable, then introduce question-relative value and show how by iterating such updates we
can get predictable, profound, and persistent polarization (Theorem 3.1 and Corollary 3.2).
We first show that the (coarse-grained) model of word-search tasks in Figure 2 (page 19)
is such that the prior η values the posterior H. Let W = {n, c, f}, where f = Find, c =
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¬Find&Completable, and n = ¬Completable. Recall that η(f) = η(c) = 14 and η(n) =
1
2 , so













3 , 0). By Theorem A.1, we must show that each Hi is modestly
informed and that η is in their convex hull.
Note that Hf (H = Hf) = 1, so Hf = Ĥf and hence is modestly informed. Meanwhile,
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4 ) = η, so η is in the convex hull of {Hf , Hc, Hn}. By Theorem
A.1, this shows that η values H.
Next turn to the model of the word-search task in Figure 1 (page 18). Recall that there
are four possibilities, label them W = {n, c, o, f}, for not Completable, Completable&¬Find,







Hf = (0, 0, 0, 1);
Ho = (0, 0, 1, 0); and







Clearly Hf and Ho are modestly informed. Note that Ĥc = Ĥn = ( 45 ,
1










5 , 0, 0) +
1




6 , 0, 0) + (0, 0,
1






6 , 0) = Hc, so Hc




















4 ) = η, so η is in the convex hull of {Hn, Hc, Ho, Hf}. By Theorem
A.1, this shows that η values H.
I now turn to question-relative value, and how this can be combined with higher-order
consolidations to iterate the (coarse-grained) Headser/Tailser models to lead to predictable
and persistent polarization.
Let a question Q be a partition of W , and let Q(w) be the partition-cell of w ∈ W .
A proposition p ⊆ W is about Q iff p =
⋃
i qi for qi ∈ Q, i.e. iff p is a partial answer to
the question Q (Hamblin 1976; Roberts 2012). Recall that a decision problem O is any set
of options (i.e. random variables—functions from worlds to numbers) on W . Say that an
option O is Q-measurable iff Q settles the value of O, i.e. for all w,w′, if Q(w) = Q(w′), then
O(w) = O(w′). Say that OQ is a decision about Q iff each of its options is Q-measurable.
Then: π values P with respect to Q iff it prefers to let P decide any decision about Q:
Value wrt Q: π values P with respect to Q iff: for every decision problem OQ about
Q, if P recommends S for OQ, then ∀O ∈ OQ : Eπ(S) ≥ Eπ(O).
π values P with respect to Q iff, for any decision about Q, it prefers to let P decide
on π’s behalf, rather than make the decision itself.
Note that one decision about Q is to choose a credence in any proposition p about Q, and
then have that credence scored using any proper scoring rule (Dorst et al. 2021, §3); therefore
to for π to value P with respect to Q, it must expect P to be more accurate than itself on
any (set of) opinion(s) about Q.
Given this, I’ll now turn to proving that updates that are valuable with respect to Q can
nevertheless lead to predictable, profound polarization about Q:
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Theorem 3.1. There is a sequence of probability functions H0, H0, H1, H1....,Hn, Hn, a
partition Q, and a proposition h =
⋃
i qi (for some qi ∈ Q) such that, as n→∞:
· H0 is (correctly) certain that Hi values Hi+1, for each i;
· H0 is (correctly) certain that Hi values Hi with respect to Q, for each i;
· H0(h) ≈ 12 and H
0(H0(h) ≈ 12) = 1; and
· H0(Hn(h) ≈ 1) ≈ 1.
I’ll proceed in stages. First, I’ll specify a model that iterates (coarse-grained) word-
search tasks and consolidates higher-order uncertainty along the way. I’ll then prove that
each substantive update is valuable period, while each consolidation update is valuable with
respect to Q. I’ll then show the long-run predictable behavior of the final rational credence
Hn in this model, and show that the proposition h = more than half the coins landed heads
is one on which Hn is predictably polarized. Afterwards, we will add a Tailser to the model
and show that such polarization is also persistent.
Definition of iteration model. Consider Haley the Headser, who faces a sequence of
n independent word-search tasks, each determined by the toss of a (new, independent) fair
coin that she’s 50% confident will land heads. Since we want to consolidate her higher-order
uncertainty between each update, we must include additional possibilities, initially ignored,
where the outcome of each task is the same, but her rational credence function updates in
different ways; consolidations will use these possibilities to hold fixed her opinions in how
the tasks went, but remove her higher-order doubts.
For each task i = 1, ..., n, let Xi = {ni, n′i, ci, c′i, fi} be the set of outcomes. fi indicates
that she finds the completion, ci and c′i are where it’s completable but she doesn’t find it,
and ni and n′i are where it’s not completable. (c′i and n′i are the ‘weird’ outcomes, initially
ignored, where the rational credence function updates differently.) Let our set of worldsW =
X1 × ...×Xn be the sequence of all possible outcomes. Let U = {w : ∃i : c′i ∈ w or n′i ∈ w}
be the set of weird-update sequences that contain at least one c′i or n′i.
Over W we lay some partitions. Let
Ni = {w ∈W : ni ∈ w or n′i ∈ w}
Ci = {w ∈W : ci ∈ w or c′i ∈ w}
Fi = {w ∈W : fi ∈ w};
Now let Qi = {Ni, Ci, Fi} be the question of how the ith task went—did she find one,
was there a completable one she missed, or was it not completable?—ignoring the further
question of how her rational opinions changed. Now let Q be the combination of all these
partitions, so that Q(x) = Q(y) iff for all i, Qi(x) = Qi(y). Notice that Headsi = Fi ∪ Ci,
and thus that any proposition about how the coins landed—one definable by specifying the
sequences of heads and tails—is about Q. Finally let Ui be the question of how the rational
credence updated at i, so U i = {U in, U ic , U if} where
U in = {w ∈W : ni ∈ w or c′i ∈ w}
U ic = {w ∈W : ci ∈ w or n′i ∈ w}
U if = {w ∈W : fi ∈ w};
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A few more bits of notation. Given a probability function π, let π[x, y, z]k (with x, y, z ≥ 0
and summing to 1) be the probability function that results from Jeffrey-shifting π on the
partition Qk = {Nk, Ck, Fk} such that the posterior assigns x to Nk, y to Ck, and z to Fk.
Explicitly, for any p ⊆W :
π[x, y, z]k(p) := x · π(p |Nk) + y · π(p |Ck) + z · π(p |Fk).
Finally, higher-order consolidations will happen not by conditioning but by imaging
(Lewis 1976), so we’ll need to define a corresponding selection function (Stalnaker 1968).
For each world w ∈W , let gw : ℘(W )→W be a selection function which is given a propos-
ition p and outputs a world gw(p) ∈ p (whenever p 6= ∅) that is the ‘closest’ one to w where
p is true. We assume g obeys three constraints:
Strong Centering: if w ∈ p, then gw(p) = w.
Q-Respecting: if possible, gw selects a world that agrees with w about Q:
If ∃x ∈ p such that Q(x) = Q(w), then gw(p) ∈ Q(w).
Sequence-Respecting: gw selects a world that agrees with w in as much of its final-
sequence as possible.
If there are two worlds x = 〈x1, ..., xn〉 and y = 〈y1, ..., yn〉 which both are in p and
have Q(x) = Q(w) = Q(y), but y has a longer w-agreeing end-sequence (xn = wn, ...
but xn−k 6= wn−k, and yn = wn, ..., yn−k = wn−k), then gw(p) 6= x.
Following Lewis 1976, for any probability function π, we let π imaged on p, π(·||p), be the
result of shifting all probability π assigns to ¬p worlds to their closest p-world counterparts.





Machinery in place, we can define the series of probability functions H0, H0, H1, H1, ...,
Hn, Hn that represent Haleys rational opinions over time. (Hi is that right after completing
the ith word-search task, while Hi is some time after that, when she’s forgotten the string
and so consolidated her higher-order uncertainty.) Recall that Hi is a description (so it picks
out different probability functions at different worlds), whereas Hiw is a rigid designator (that
always picks out the function that Hi associates with w).
Recalling that U = {w : ∃i : c′i ∈ w or n′i ∈ w} is the set of worlds that contain a weird




Moreover assume H0w treats the Qi as mutually independent, thus for any qi1 , ..., qik in
Qi1 , ..., Qik respectively, H0w(qi1&...&qik) = H0w(qi1)H0w(qi2) · · ·H0w(qik). Since H0w(U) = 0,
this pins down H0w uniquely over W , hence all worlds begin with the same prior.
Now we define the updates as follows. For any world w and task i, the consolidation Hi
is obtained by imaging on the proposition that the Hi equals the particular function Hiw.
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As we’ll see, these consolidation-updates change her higher-order opinions (removing higher-
order doubts) without changing her first-order opinions about Q.
Finally, we define the regular (non-consolidation) updates as Jeffrey-shifts in exactly the
way indicated by the (coarse-grained) word-search model, except that c′i+1 and n′i+1 (the
ones initially assigned 0 probability) update in a way the opposite way from what their
word-search outcome would indicate. Thus for all w and i < n:
If fi+1 ∈ w, then Hi+1w = Hiw[0, 0, 1]i+1;
If ci+1 ∈ w or n′i+1 ∈ w, then Hi+1w = Hiw[ 13 ,
2
3 , 0]i+1;
If ni+1 ∈ w or c′i+1 ∈ w, then Hi+1w = Hiw[ 23 ,
1
3 , 0]i+1;
Having defined the iteration model, we now establish a variety of its features, including that
its updates are (Q-)valuable and what the long-run behavior of Hn is.
Lemma 3.1.1. (1) For each i and w: Hiw is higher-order certain. (2) Moreover, for i > 1,





Proof. (1) Suppose Hiw(x) > 0. By definition, Hiw(x) = Hiw(x||Hi = Hiw) > 0. By the
definition of imaging, x ∈ [Hi = Hiw], i.e. Hix = Hiw. Thus Hix = Hix(·||Hi = Hix) =
Hiw(·||Hi = Hiw) = Hiw. Since x was arbitrary, Hiw(Hi = Hiw) = 1.
(2) By definition Hiw is obtained from H
i−1
w by Jeffrey-shifting in a way that preserves
certainties, therefore if Hiw(x) > 0 then H
i−1
w (x) > 0, so by (1), Hi−1w = Hi−1x .
Now we show that weird updates are always assigned probability 0 ahead of time:
Lemma 3.1.2. For any w, x, i < j, if n′j ∈ x or c′j ∈ x, then Hiw(x) = 0 and Hiw(x) = 0.
Proof. By induction. Base case: By construction, H0w(U) = 0, so H0w(x) = 0. Since
H0x = H
0
x, likewise for H0x. Induction: Supposing it holds for all w with k < i, we show it
holds for i. SinceHiw = H
i−1
w [a1, a2, a3]i, and this doesn’t raise any probabilities from 0, since
(by induction) Hi−1w (x) = 0, likewise Hiw(x) = 0. Now suppose, for reductio, Hiw(x) > 0.
Thus there must be a y such that Hiw(y) > 0 and gy(Hi = Hiw) = x. But since Hiw didn’t
assign positive probability to any world with n′j or c′j in it, those are not in y and yet they
are in x. If Hiy = Hiw, then (by Strong Centering) gy(Hi = Hiw) = y, so this is impossible;
hence Hiy 6= Hiw. Since Hiw(y) > 0, and if w ∈ fi then Hiw would be higher-order certain, it
must be that either (i) w ∈ U ic and y ∈ U in, or (ii) w ∈ U in and y ∈ U ic . Since we must’ve had
Hi−1w (y) > 0, by the inductive hypothesis we know either ci ∈ y or ni ∈ y (not c′i ∈ y nor
n′i ∈ y). So if (i), then y′ = 〈y1, ..., n′i..., yn〉—which swaps out n′i for ni in y and is a world
that is in the same Q-cell as y—updates the same as w so Hiy′ = H
i
w. Since y′ agrees with
the end-sequence of y more than x does (since n′j ∈ x or c′j ∈ x), by Sequence-Respecting,
gy(Hi = Hiw) 6= x—contradiction. If (ii), parallel reasoning works substituting c′i into y,
completing the proof.
We now show that our consolidations never move probability mass from oneQ-cell to another:
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Lemma 3.1.3. For any x, i: if Hix(y) > 0, then gy(Hi = Hix) ∈ Q(y).
Proof. By Lemma 3.1.1 (2), Hi−1x = Hi−1y . By Lemma 3.1.2 and the fact that Hix preserves
Hi−1x ’s certainties, neither c′i ∈ y nor n′i ∈ y; hence either fi ∈ y or ci ∈ y or ni ∈ y.
If fi ∈ x, then of course fi ∈ y and so Hiy = Hix, meaning that by Strong Centering
gy(Hi = Hix) = y, establishing the result.










x, so again we have
the result. But suppose ni ∈ y instead. Then y = 〈y1, ..., yi−1, ni, yi+1..., yn〉. Consider the
possibility y′ = 〈y1, ..., yi−1, n′i, yi+1, ..., yn〉, which is the same as y except that it swaps n′i
















3 , 0]i = H
i
x.
Thus there is a y′ in [Hi = Hix] such that Q(y′) = Q(y), so by Q-Respecting gy(Hi = Hix) ∈
Q(y), establishing the result.
If ni ∈ x or c′ ∈ x, parallel reasoning (substituting c′i for ci) establishes the result.















But by Lemma 3.1.4, all and only worlds in q are mapped to worlds in q by imaging on
















the Qi as mutually independent.
Proof. By induction. Base case: trivial by definition of H0w. Induction step: Suppose it
holds for k < i. By definition, Hiw is obtained by Jeffrey-shifting H
i−1
w on Qi, so since by the
induction hypothesis Hi−1w treats the Qi as mutually independent and assigns 14 to Fj and
Cj , and 12 to Nj , H
i
w does too. Now by Lemma 3.1.4, Hiw maintains the same distribution
over Q as Hiw has, establishing the result.
Lemma 3.1.6. For all w and i, Hiw values Hi+1w .
Proof. Letting Siw := {x ∈W : Hiw(x) > 0} be the support of Hiw, by Theorem A.1 we must




(1) Taking an arbitrary x ∈ Siw, we show that Hi+1x is modestly informed. By Lemma
3.1.1 (1), note that since Hiw(x) is higher-order certain, Hix = Hiw. Now either (i) fi+1 ∈ x,
or (ii) ci+1 ∈ x or n′i+1 ∈ x, or (iii) ni+1 ∈ x or c′i+1 ∈ x. Supposing (i), then Hi+1x =
Hix[0, 0, 1]i+1, meaning Hi+1x (Fi) = 1 so that if Hi+1x (y) > 0, then fi+1 ∈ y, and Hi+1y =
Hi+1x . Hence Hi+1x (Hi+1 = Hi+1x ) = 1, so trivially Hi+1 is modestly informed. On the other










3 , 0]i+1—label this function πc. If




3 , 0]i+1—label this function πn. Note that πc and πn both
assign 1 to Siw, and also assign 1 to [Hi+1 = πc] ∨ [Hi+1 = πn]. Now, since by Lemma 3.1.2
we have that Hiw assigns 0 to any world with n′i+1 or c′i+1 in it, it follows that πc and πn do
too, and hence that:
π̂c = πc(·|Hi+1 = πc) = Hiw(·|Ci+1)
π̂n = πn(·|Hi+1 = πn) = Hiw(·|Ni+1)


























Since πc, πn, and Hix(·|Fi+1) are the three realizations of Hi+1 in Siw, this establishes (1).

































This establishes that Hiw is in the convex hull of the realizations of Hi+1 that it leaves open,
completing the proof.
Corollary 3.1.7. For all w, i: Hiw values Hi.
Proof. For i = 0, this is trivial. For i > 0, by construction, Hiw(x) > 0 only if H
i−1
w (x) > 0,
and by Lemma 3.1.6, this implies that Hix is modestly informed. Since Hiw(Hi = Hiw) > 0,
trivially Hiw is in the convex hull of the realizations of Hi it leaves open. Thus by Theorem
A.1, the result holds.
Lemma 3.1.8. For all x, i: Hix values Hi with respect to Q.
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Proof. By Lemma 3.1.4, for any q ∈ Q: Hix(Hi(q) = Hi(q)) = 1. It follows that for any
decision-problem OQ based on Q, Hi recommends strategy S for OQ iff Hi recommends S
for OQ. Since, by Corollary 3.1.7, Hix values Hi, it follows immediately that Hix values Hi
with respect to Q.
Lemmas 3.1.6 and 3.1.8 establish the first two bullet-points of Theorem 3.1; we now focus
on establishing the second two.
Recall that h = more than half the coins land heads is a proposition about Q, and
that for each Headsi = Fi ∪ Ci, Hi(Headsi) = 12 , mutually independently. Thus letting
#h be a random variable for the number of coins that land heads, H0(#h = k) is a binomial
distribution with parameters 12 and n. Since each sequence of heads and tails is equally likely,
and as n→∞ the proportion of sequences with more than half heads tends to 1/2, the third
bullet-point follows: H0(h) ≈ 12 , and since H
0 is higher-order certain, H0(H0(h) ≈ 12) = 1.
To establish the final bullet-point, that H0(Hn(h) ≈ 1) ≈ 1, we establish the long-run
behavior of Hn (which, by Lemma 3.1.4, establishes it for Hn).
Lemma 3.1.9. With Headsi = Fi ∪ Ci, we have, for all w, i, H0w assigns probability 1 to:
· Fi → [Hn(Headsi) = 1];
· Ci → [Hn(Headsi) = 23 ]; and
· Ni → [Hn(Headsi) = 13 ].
Proof. Combining Lemma 3.1.5 with the definition of the update, we know immediately that
Hiw’s distribution over the partition 〈Fi, Ci, Ni〉 follows the above pattern:
· If fi ∈ w, then Hiw(Fi) = 1;
· If ci ∈ w or n′i ∈ w, then Hiw’s distribution over 〈Fi, Ci, Ni〉 is ( 13 ,
2
3 , 0);
· If ni ∈ w or c′i ∈ w, then Hiw’s distribution over 〈Fi, Ci, Ni〉 is ( 23 ,
1
3 , 0).
Since H0(U) = 0, so H0w assigns 0 to any world with n′i or c′i in it, it suffices to show that Hn
follow the same pattern. By Lemma 3.1.5, each Hj treats the Qk as mutually independent,
so by definition none of the later Jeffrey-shifts—for j ≥ i, the update from Hj to Hj+1—
change the probabilities in Qk. And by Lemma 3.1.4, none of the consolidations (from Hj
to Hj) do so either. Thus Hn follows the above pattern as well, establishing the result.
From here, the law of large numbers quickly takes us to the desired conclusion:
Lemma 3.1.10. For any ε > 0, as n→∞, H0(Hn(h) ≥ 1− ε)→ 1.
Proof. Choosing an arbitrary ε > 0, let x ≈ y mean that x is within ε of y. Sort the time
indices into groups by their outcomes, so IF := {i : Qi = Fi}, IC := {i : Qi = Ci}, and
IN := {i : Qi = Ni}. Since H0 treats that the Qi as i.i.d. with H0(Fi) = H0(Ci) = 14 , by
the law of large numbers, as n → ∞, H0
(
|IF | ≈ n4 & |IC | ≈
n




→ 1. We want to
show what follows if this obtains, so suppose it does: |IF | ≈ n4 & |IC | ≈
n
4 & |IN | ≈
n
2 .
What is true of Hn? We have from Lemma 3.1.9 that:
For all i ∈ IF , Hn(Headsi) = 1;
For all i ∈ IC , Hn treats Headsi as i.i.d. with Hn(Headsi) = 23 ; and
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For all i ∈ IN , Hn treats Headsi as i.i.d. with Hn(Headsi) = 13 .
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proportion of all flips that land heads. Combining the fact that |IF | ≈ n4 & |IC | ≈
n
4 & |IN | ≈
n




























= Hn(h) ≈ 1
Since this follows from |IF | ≈ n4 & |IC | ≈
n
4 & |IN | ≈
n
2 , and H
0 is arbitrarily confident of
that conjunction, it follows that as n→∞, H0(Hn(h) ≈ 1)→ 1, completing the proof.
This completes the proof of Theorem 3.1: Lemma 3.1.6 establishes the first bullet-point,
Lemma 3.1.8 establishes the second, the reasoning on page 45 establishes the third, and
Lemma 3.1.10 establishes the fourth.
Finally, we can add Tailsers to this model to establish that such predictable, profound
polarization is also persistent :
Corollary 3.2. There are two sequences of probability functions H0, H0,..., Hn and T 0,
T 0,...,Tn, a partition Q and a proposition h =
⋃
i qi (for some qi ∈ Q) such that, as n→∞:
· Both H0 and T 0 are (correctly) certain that, for all i:
· Hi values Hi+1 and T i values T i+1;
· Hi values Hi with respect to Q, and T i values T i with respect to Q; and
· H0 = T 0, and in particular H0(h) = T 0(h) ≈ 12 ; yet
· H0 and T 0 are both arbitrarily confident of Hn(h) ≈ 1 and Tn(h) ≈ 0; and
· H0 and T 0 are arbitrarily confident ofHn
(
h
∣∣∣Tn(h) ≈ 0) ≈ 1 and Tn(h∣∣∣Hn(h) ≈ 1) ≈ 0.
Proof. All but the final bullet-point are straightforward generalizations of the proofs of The-
orem 3.1, gotten by dividing possibilities further to track which updates T i goes through,
consolidating throughout the process in a way that maintains opinions about Q, and adding
the partitions Qti = {F ii , Cti , N ti }, where F ti ∪ Cti = Ni and N ti = Fi ∪ Ci. By doing so, we
create a model in which both H0 and T 0 are (correctly) certain that:
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· Fi&N ti →
(
Hn(Headsi) = 1 & Tn(Headsi) = 23
)
· Ci&N ti →
(





Hn(Headsi) = 13 & T
n(Headsi) = 13
)
· Ni&F ti →
(
Hn(Headsi) = 13 & T
n(Headsi) = 0
)
with Hn and Tn treating the Headsi as mutually independent. Moreover, H0 = T 0, and
both treat the Qi as mutually independent, as well as the Qti, assigning e.g.:




· H0(F ti ) = H0(Cti ) = 14 , while H
0(N ti ) =
1
2 .


















≈ 1, and so Tn(h) ≈ 0.
To establish the final bullet-point, of persistent polarization, notice that by the weak law
of large numbers, both H0 and T 0 are arbitrarily confident that (where IF t = {i : Qti = F ti },
etc.) |IF | ≈ n4 & |IC | ≈
n
4 & |IF t | ≈
n
4 & |ICt | ≈
n
4 . Supposing this obtains, we show
that the resulting polarization on Hn (and, by parallel reasoning, Tn) is persistent—which
suffices to show that it is predictable, profound, and persistent.68
Note that, since Hn remains certain of the above four conditionals, we have:












n(Ni&Ft) = Hn(Ni&Ct) =
1
6 , we
have: Hn(Tn(Headsi) = 23) =
2
3 , H
n(Tn(Headsi) = 0) =
1
6 , and H
n(Tn(Headsi) = 13) =
1
6 .








2 . Since H
n












n(Ni&Ft) = Hn(Ni&Ct) =
1
3 , we
have: Hn(Tn(Headsi) = 23) =
1
3 , H
n(Tn(Headsi) = 0) =
1
3 , and H
n(Tn(Headsi) = 13) =
1
3 .








3 . Since H
n








68Strictly, we should use different bounds for the ≈ at different levels of nesting, but since all can be made
arbitrarily small by making n large enough, I ignore this complication.
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2) → 1. And since Hn is certain that Tn treats the Headsi independ-
ently, it follows that Hn(Tn(∑ni=1 1Headsin > 12) ≈ 0) → 1, i.e. that Hn(Tn(h) ≈ 0) → 1. Thus
it follows that as n → ∞, Hn(h|Tn(h) ≈ 0) → Hn(h) → 1. Since Hn(h) = Hn(h) and
Tn(h) = Tn(h), and since H0 is arbitrarily confident of this outcome, this establishes the
desired result.
By parallel reasoning, it is likewise true that as n→∞, T 0 becomes arbitrarily confident
that Tn(h|Hn(h) ≈ 1)→ Tn(h)→ 0, completing the proof.
B Experimental Details
This appendix contains the details of the experiment discussed in §3.2.
250 participants were recruited through Prolific (107 F/139 M/4 Other; mean age = 27.06;
pre-registration here: https://aspredicted.org/8jg3e.pdf).69 Subjects were (pseudo)randomly
divided into Ambiguous (A) and Unambiguous (U) conditions. Within each condition, they
were further (pseudorandomly) divided into “Headsers" and “Tailsers". I will abbreviate the
groups “A-Hsers"; “A-Tsers"; “U-Hsers", and “U-Tsers". Each group was told they’d
be given evidence about a series of independent, fair coin tosses. Both groups were given
standard instructions about how to use a 0–100% scale to rate their confidence in the answer
to a yes/no question, and then given specialized instructions.
The A group was informed about how word-search tasks work, and given three examples
(‘P A ET’ [planet], ‘CO R D’, [uncompletable] and ‘ E RT’ [heart]). The A-Hsers were
instructed that they’d see a completable string if the coin landed heads, and an uncompletable
if it landed tails. The A-Tsers were instructed vice versa.
The U group was given instructions about how the urn task worked. For U-Hsers, if
the coin landed heads then the urn contained 1 black marble and 1 non-black marble; if
it landed tails, it contained two non-black marbles. (For U-Tsers, ‘heads’ and ‘tails’ were
reversed.) The colors of the non-black marbles changed across trials to emphasize that they
were different urns.
69I made several mistakes at the pre-registration phase: (1) failing to realize I had collected time-series data
for individual participant’s average confidence—which allowed me to increase statistical power over merely
pooling all participants’ judgments—and (2) failing to plan both the ANOVA and difference-of-difference
confidence intervals that could further confirm my second prediction.The main text reported the results after
correcting this; here I report both pre-registered and post-hoc tests (the upshots are the same).
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Both groups saw four independent tasks, and were asked before and afterwards how
confident they were in the outcome.70 The pre-task question was an attention-check, wherein
they were instructed to move the slider to 50%; it was pre-registered that I would exclude
participants who failed two or more of these attention-checks. In total, 25 of 250 participants
were excluded in this way.
The order of the tasks was randomized. Each subject in the A-group saw two completable
and two uncompletable strings. (The completable strings were randomly drawn from the list,
{FO E T, ST N, FR L} (forest/foment; stain/stern; frail/frill); the uncompletable
strings were drawn from the list, {TR P R, ST RE, P G ER}.) Each subject in the
U-group saw 3 tasks in which a non-black marble was drawn, and 1 in which a black marble
was (simulating the expected rate of drawing black marbles from a fair coin and urn).
From the responses of each group to each question, I calculated their prior and posterior
confidence that the coin landed heads in each toss (for Hsers, this was the number they
reported as their confidence; for Tsers, it was obtained by subtracting this number from 100).
I pooled such responses across all participants and items to calculate the following statistics.
(Note: As discussed below, we obtain more statistical power if we group by participant and
calculate their mean confidence as they view more tasks; those stronger statistics were what
was reported in the main text in §3.2, page 21.)
I predicted (predictions 1–3) that the ambiguous evidence would lead to polarization, and
(predictions 4–6) that it would lead to more polarization than the unambiguous evidence:
1. The mean A-Hser posterior in heads would be higher than the prior (of 50%).
2. The mean A-Tser posterior in heads would be lower than the prior (of 50%).
3. The mean A-Hser posterior would be higher than the mean A-Tser posterior in heads.
4. The mean A-Hser posterior would be higher than the mean U-Hser posterior.
5. The mean A-Tser posterior would be lower than the mean U-Tser posterior.
6. The mean difference between A-Hser posteriors and A-Tser posteriors would be larger
than that between the U-Hser posteriors and U-Tser posteriors.
Predictions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 were confirmed with statistically significant results; Prediction
4 had the divergence in the correct direction but it was not statistically significant. Plots
of prior and posterior mean confidences in each group, along with 95% confidence intervals,
displayed in Figure 14:
In more detail: one-sided paired t-test for Prediction 1 indicated that A-Hser priors (M
= 50.35, SD = 3.26) were lower than A-Hser posteriors (M = 57.71, SD = 30.33) with
t(219) = 3.58, p < 0.001, d = 0.341. One-sided paired t-test for Prediction 2 indicated that
A-Tser posteriors (M = 36.29, SD = 31.04) were lower than A-Tser priors (M = 49.60, SD
= 2.90), with t(191) = 5.90, p < 0.001, d = 0.604. And one-sided independent samples
t-test for Prediction 3 indicated that A-Hser posteriors (M = 57.71, SD = 30.33) were higher
than A-Tser posteriors (M = 36.29, SD = 31.04), with t(410) = 7.07, p < 0.001, d = 0.699.
Meanwhile, one-sided independent samples t-test for Prediction 4 failed to indicate that A-
Hser posteriors (M = 57.71, SD = 30.33) were higher than U-Hser posteriors (M = 54.64,
70The A-group was asked how confident they were that “that the string is completable”—equivalent to
“coin landed heads” for A-Hsers, and “coin landed tails” for A-Tsers. The U-group was asked how confident















Figure 14: Mean prior and posterior confidence in heads in A (left) and U (right) conditions. Bars represent
95% confidence intervals.
SD = 26.93), with t(441) = 1.15, p = 0.125, d = 0.107. But one-sided independent samples
t-test for Prediction 5 indicated that A-Tser posteriors (M = 36.29, SD = 31.04) were below
U-Tser posteriors (M =48.10, SD = 28.47), with t(393) = 4.07, p < 0.001, d = 0.398.
Prediction 6 was (due to my oversight) handled poorly at the pre-registration stage—I
only planned to calculate 95% confidence intervals for the differences between A-Hser and A-
Tser posteriors as well as U-Hser and U-Tser posteriors, and compare them. This comparison
went as predicted: the 95% confidence interval for the difference between A-Hsers and A-
Tsers was [15.2, 27.2], while that for the difference between U-Hsers and U-Tsers was [1.8,
11.8]. Since the former dominates the latter, it indicates a larger difference.
What should’ve been planned, I later realized, was to do (a) a 2× 2 ANOVA, and (b) an
empirically bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for the difference between the differences
between A-Hsers/A-Tsers and U-Hsers/U-Tsers.
(a) Let valence be the variable for whether the subject was a Headser (= 1) or Tailser
(= 0), and ambiguity be the variable for whether the subject was in the A (= 1) or U (= 0)
group. Analyzing the results using a 2 (valence: Hser vs. Tser) by 2 (ambiguity: A vs. U)
ANOVA indicated that there was a main effect of valence (F (1, 899) = 46.47, p < 0.001,
η2 = 0.048), a marginally significant main effect of ambiguity (F (1, 899) = 4.31, p = 0.038,
η2 = 0.005), and (as should’ve been predicted) an interaction effect between valence and
ambiguity (F (1, 899) = 14.57, p < 0.001, η2 = 0.015), indicating that the divergence between
Headsers and Tailsers was exacerbated by having ambiguous evidence.
(b) Meanwhile, the empirically bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for the difference
between differences between A-Hsers/A-Tsers and U-Hsers/U-Tsers was [7.2, 22.6], indicating
that the Hsers and Tsers in the ambiguous condition diverged in opinion more than in
the unambiguous condition. And while there was a significant difference between U-Hser
posteriors (M = 54.64, SD = 26.93) and U-Tser posteriors (M = 48.10, SD = 28.47), with
t(486) = 2.61 and (two-sided) p = 0.009, the effect size was smaller (d = 0.236) than for the
difference between A-Hser and A-Tser posteriors (as mentioned, d = 0.699).
A further oversight on my part at the pre-registration phase was that I only realized after
the fact that I actually had access to time-series data about how the participants’ confidence
evolves over time. In particular, using their priors and posteriors for each of the four coin
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tosses, I could calculate their average confidence in heads after seeing n bits of evidence, for
n ranging from 0 to 4.71 (For Bayesians, this average confidence equals their estimate for
the proportion of times the coin landed heads.72 )
In other words, we can re-run the above statistics by pooling responses within subjects at
each stage in their progression through the experiment. All the predicted results above hold
true with this way of carving up the data (with universally lower p-values and higher effect
sizes, since the variance of the data has dropped; Prediction 5 is still the only non-significant
effect). These are the statistics I reported in the main text (§3.2, page 21).
A supplemental prediction was intended to probe the hypothesis that (something like)
the model in Figure 2 is driving the effect. Within the ambiguous condition, I predicted
that amongst those who didn’t find a completion, the average confidence that their string
was completable would be higher if it was completable (bottom right possibility of Figure 2)
than if it wasn’t (bottom left). This would indicate sensitivity to whether or not there was
a word, over and above whether or not they found one.
To test this, in addition to recording their confidence, the experiment explicitly asked
subjects in the ambiguous condition whether they found a completion. This data failed to
confirm the supplemental prediction (t(243) = 1.11, p = 0.13, one-sided). However, I noticed
that a substantial proportion of people who claimed to have found a word did not have the
extreme confidence that they should’ve if so (39% of them were less than 95% confident
there was a completion, and 25% of them were less than 80%), indicating that self-reports
of ‘finding’ might’ve been unreliable. If we rerun the data by operationalizing ‘finding’ as
‘reporting 100% confidence there’s a completion’, the prediction is confirmed.73
Finally, post-hoc analyses show two further trends that support the role of ambiguity.
First, since it’s natural to expect ambiguity—uncertainty about how to react to evidence—
to cause variance in people’s opinions, we should expect the word-search condition to have
more variance than the urn condition. This is what we find. Restricting attention to those
with weak (so, potentially ambiguous) evidence—those who did not find a completion, or
who did not see a black marble—the variance in opinions was much higher in the ambiguous
condition than in the unambiguous one. This can be seen in the plots in Figure 15, and
is confirmed by tests for equality of variance.74 (Notice that the there remains a nontrivial
amount of variance even in the unambiguous condition. Thus it may be that low levels of
ambiguity—people being unsure how confident to be in response to a red marble—could be
driving the small degree of polarization found in the unambiguous condition.)
Second, recall that the above (§3) model predicts that the mechanism that will drive po-
71 I.e. at stage 0 average their priors for all tosses; at stage 1, average their posterior for the first toss with
their priors from the 3 remaining; at stage 2, average their posteriors for the first two tosses with their priors
from the remaining 2, etc.
















] = E[proportion of heads].
73Amongst those who were less than 100% confident there was a completion, a one-sided t-test found that
the average confidence for those looking at uncompletable strings (M = 44.60, SD = 25.15) was significantly
below the average confidence for those looking at completable strings (M = 52.26, SD = 22.98), with
t(309) = 2.77, p = 0.003, d = 0.32.
74Word-search Headsers’ variance was 563.33, while urn Headsers’ was 285.28, Conover = 5.40, p < 0.001;





















































































Figure 15: Histograms of judgments given weak evidence. Left: word-search. Right: urn.
larization is that the accuracy of the rational opinions will increase asymmetrically : Headsers
will be better at recognizing heads-cases; Tailsers will be better at recognizing tails-cases. As
can be seen in Figure 16, this is what we find. When presented with uncompletable strings
(Tails cases for Headsers; Heads cases for Tailsers), neither group’s average posterior moved
significantly from their priors of 50%; but when they saw a completable string, it moved sig-
nificantly in the direction of the truth. These data confirm the hypothesis that asymmetric
accuracy-increases in rational credence can lead to polarization.75 (The mean squared errors
of their average prior vs. posterior is: for Headsers, 0.5(1−0.5037)2+0.5(0−0.5034)2 = 0.250
vs. 0.5(1− 0.6742)2 + 0.5(0− 0.4773)2 = 0.167; for Tailsers, 0.253 vs. 0.166.)
Headser prior Headser posterior Tailser prior Tailser posterior
Heads cases: 50.37* 67.42 49.34* 48.00*
Tails cases: 50.34* 47.73* 49.86* 24.84
Overall: 50.35* 57.7 49.60* 36.29
Figure 16: Ambiguous condition, mean prior and posterior confidence in Heads, by cases.
* = not significantly different from 50%.
75Interestingly, recalling the hypothesis that the average of people’s actual opinions will equal the rational
opinions (§3), these the data suggest that an even simpler (value-validating) ambiguous-evidence model may









This appendix contains the details of the simulations used in §§4–5. It can be read on its own,
or in tandem with the Mathematica notebook (https://github.com/kevindorst/RP_notebook)
which contains a working version of all code.
C.1 Cognitive Search Models (§4)
This subsection explains the generalizations of the (course-grained) word-search-task models
that I call cognitive search models. We are to imagine an agent doing a cognitive search for
flaws in a piece of evidence that purports to support or tell against a given proposition q.
The general form of such a model divides the worlds into 3 classes, depending on whether the
agent finds a flaw (F ), there is a flaw that they don’t find (C; the search is “Completable”),
or there is no flaw (N). Within each class are (at least) two worlds that have the same
posteriors, but which differ on whether the target proposition q is true.
Letting π be the prior and P the posterior (with Pw its realization at world w), a cognitive
search model is any in which:
· π(q|F ) = π(q|C).
(The existence of a flaw is what affects the probability of q, not whether you find it.)
· For any w ∈ N : Pw = π(·|¬F ).
(If there’s no flaw, all you learn is that you didn’t find one.)
· For any w ∈ F : Pw = π(·|F )
(If you find a flaw, you learn exactly that.)
· For any x, y ∈ C: Px = Py, Px(F ) = 0, and Px(C) ≥ π(C|¬F ).
(If there is a flaw that you don’t find, that determines the rational credence; you learn
that you didn’t find one; and you assign at least as much credence to this possibility
as you would if that were all you learned.)
Such models are a simple generalization of the course-grained model of the word-search task
from Figure 2—they can likewise be seen as the result of coarse-graining a more detailed
model, e.g. one that distinguishes whether the flaw is obvious or not. For x ∈ C and y ∈ N ,
we must have Px(C) ≥ Py(C) to satisfy the value of evidence; when Px = Py, the model is
unambiguous and just consists in conditioning on whether or not you found a completion;
but when Px(C) > Py(C), the evidence is ambiguous (since Py(x) > 0 and Px 6= Py)—and
this is the ambiguity that leads to expectable polarization.
The simplest cognitive search models consist of 6 worlds (two in each of F , C, and
N) plus a prior over them. (In Mathematica, we represent this with a 7 -world frame in
which the first world encodes the prior and is assigned probability 0 by all worlds, including
itself.) Such models can be parameterized in a variety of ways; the funtion csQModel takes
one such set of parameters and generates the resulting cognitive-search model. The function
getBBCondQCSModel takes a prior in q, the degree to which finding a flaw would move it, and
a probability of finding a flaw, and outputs a random cognitive search model by generating
a random probability of there being a flaw (uniform from [0,1]), and then using that and the
above to fix all the other parameters in a cognitive-search model.
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Given a cognitive search model and some posterior probability function Pw, we can get
the (Brier) inaccuracy of that function at w by taking the mean squared distance between
it’s probability of each world x and the truth-value of {x} at w. (We use this form of
the Brier score, rather than summing across all propositions, for computational tractability.)
Thus getGlobPartitionInAcc takes a probability frame (specified using a stochastic matrix,
where row i column j equals Pi(j)) and a world w, and outputs the Brier inaccuracy of Pw
at w. By subtracting this number from 1 we get a Brier measure of the accuracy of Pw.
And by taking the expectation of this value, according to our prior π, we get π’s expected
accuracy of the posterior rational credence function for the update encoded in this model.
We can then test the correlation between the probability of finding a flaw if there is one,
and the expected accuracy of the update. There are a variety of ways to run such simulations.
One issue is that when the gBump is large, i.e. the searches might shift your credence quite a
bit, that introduces noise in the correlation. Thus I constrained such bumps to be small (as
they will be in ensuing simulations), between 0 and 0.2. To minimize noise, I also fixed the
prior in q at 0.5—but similar results are obtained by setting it to any other number. This
simulation led to the plot on the left of Figure 5 (page 25).
Given this, we can test what proportion of the time expected accuracy favors scrutinizing
incongruent studies rather than congruent ones, as a function of how much more likely you
are (on average) to find extant flaws in the former than the latter. The simulations I ran
fixed a given prior in q, and then generated pairs of cognitive-search models (one of which
would raise your credence in q if you found a flaw, the other of which would lower it), such
that the the probability of finding a flaw was pulled from distributions with steadily higher
means for the incongruent study and steadily lower means for the congruent one. As the
gap in means grew, the proportion of pairs in which expected accuracy favors scrutinizing
the incongruent study grew as well—i.e. selective scrutiny became more and more common.
This led to the plot on the right of Figure 5 (page 25).
This finally puts us in a position to run a full simulation of two groups of agents, presented
with pairs of studies, but one group (red) is better at finding flaws with studies that tell
against q, while the other group (blue) is better at finding flaws with those that tell in
favor of q. At each stage, each agent chooses which study to scrutinize based on which one
they expect to make them most accurate, and then updates their credences with probability
matching the various outcomes of that update-model.
There are a variety of choice-points in how to run such simulations. Although variations
on the theme will lead to the same result, here are the ones I made. First, agents always
have accurate beliefs about how likely they are to find a flaw in each study; this probability
varies from a minimum of 0.1 to a maximum of 0.9; red agents are pulling (uniformly) from
[0.1 + findGap, 0.9] and blue agents are pulling (uniformly) from [0.1, 0.9− findGap]. This
parameter findGap can range from 0 (where there’s no different between the groups) to
0.8 (where the difference is maximal). The simulation I displayed is with a gap of 0.5, but
generally the rate of polarization grows as the gap increases.
Second, the amount agent’s credences would move if they found a flaw in the study
was limited to an initial upper bound (of 0.125), which was steadily lowered as agents
saw more studies and the “weight” behind their credence in q was correspondingly increased.
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hardenSpeed is a parameter that controls how quickly agents harden in opinions; the smaller
it is, the more polarization generally results but also the more chaotic their confidence-
trajectories.
The result of running this simulation with these parameters and 300 pairs of studies are
displayed in Figure 6 (page 26).
Robustness. We can check for robustness in two ways. First, by simulating 100 red
(“pro") agents and 100 blue (“con”) agents with these parameters, we get estimates for their
posterior average credences at 0.600 (95% confidence interval = [0.575, 0.624]) and 0.390
(95% confidence interval = [0.370, 0.411]), respectively.
Obviously these exact numbers will vary as we vary the parameters in the simulation.
Thus we can also check for robustness by varying these parameters. At the end of section
(1) on Cognitive Search in the Mathematica notebook, cross-variations on findGap and
hardenSpeed are run, showing that as findGap grows (up to a point) and hardenSpeed
shrinks, polarization becomes more extreme.
C.2 Argument Models (§5)
This subsection explains the simple models of arguments used in §5, before introducing
scrutiny of arguments. We are to imagine you know that you are about to be presented
with an argument in favor of a given claim (q). The general form of such models divides the
worlds into two classes, depending on whether the argument is good (G) or bad (B). If the
argument is good, it’s rational to increase your confidence in q; if it’s bad, you’re rational to
decrease it. For simplicity, we assume there are only two posteriors you could end up with;
moreover, we assume the argument will be more ambiguous if it’s bad.
Thus where π is the prior and P is the posterior (with Pw its realization at world w), an
argument-for-q model is any in which {G,B} is a partition and in which:
· π(q|G) > π(q) > π(q|B)
(If the argument is good, q is more likely to be true; if not, it’s not.)
· For any x, y: if x, y ∈ G, then Px = Py; and if x, y ∈ B, then Px = Py
(Whether the argument is good or bad fully determines the rational posterior.)
· ∃a, b > 0, a ≥ b: if x ∈ G and y ∈ B, Px(G) = π(G) + a and Py(B) = π(B) + b.
(Whether the argument is good or bad, your confidence should shift toward the truth;
but—since good arguments are easier to recognize—it should shiftmore if the argument
is good than if it’s bad.)
In such models in which there are two posteriors—Pg for worlds in G and Pb for worlds
in B—π values the update iff it is less extreme than (in the convex hull of) Pg and Pb,
and Pg(G) ≥ Pb(G) (and, by symmetry, Pb(B) ≥ Pa(B)). This follows from the above
specification; the only additional constraint we add is that Pg(G) shifts more from π(G)
than Pb(B) does from π(B).
The simplest argument models consist of 4 worlds (two in each of G and B) plus a prior
over them. (In Mathematica, we represent this with a 5 -world frame in which the first world
encodes the prior and is assigned probability 0 by all worlds, including itself). Such models
can be parameterized in a variety of ways; the function getArgModel does so using π(q)
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(priorQ), π(q|G) (gInf), Pg(G) for g ∈ G (gConf), π(q|B) (gInf), and Pb(B) for b ∈ B
(bConf).
An argument favors q if it’s an argument-for-q model, so π(q|G) > π(q), and the shift
in confidence about the argument is higher if G than if B; an argument disfavors q if it’s
an argument-for-¬q model, so π(q|G) < π(q), and the shift in confidence about the ar-
gument is higher if G than if B. To generate random instances of such arguments, use
getRandFavShiftArgModel and getRandDisShiftArgModel respectively. Both take a prior
probability of q, a constraint on how far this probability might shift as a result of seeing the
argument, and a prior probability that the argument is good.
Given such functions, we can simulate presenting a group of (red) agents with random
arguments that favor q, and a separate group of (blue) agents with random arguments that
disfavor q. Again, there are a variety of choice-points in how to run such simulations. First, I
assume agents always have accurate beliefs about how likely the arguments they’re presented
with are to be good or bad. Second, I assumed all arguments are equally likely to be good—
π(G) was drawn uniformly from [0, 1]. Finally, in addition to questions about the number
of agents and arguments to simulate, we can modify how much in principle arguments could
initially shift opinions, and how quickly agent’s opinions “harden” (become less susceptible
to change with new arguments).
I simulated the result of 20 agents in each group, each witnessing 100 (different) random
arguments, with an initial maximum potential shift (baseShift) of 0.2; the result is the plot
displayed in Figure 8.
The code also allows for simulations to vary the rate at which each group of agents is
presented with good arguments, in particular using favGBound to lower-bound the probab-
ility that a red group-member’s argument is good (π(G) drawn from [favGBound, 1]) and
upper-bound the probability that a blue-member’s is (π(G) drawn from [0, 1− favGBound]).
The code runs simulations with 30 agents and 50 arguments, with the above parameters
for possible shifts and hardening speed, with favGBound at 0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 0.95.
The effects of varying this parameter are not straightforward—at low levels it does little;
at intervening levels it seems to move both groups move towards belief in q (still with a
substantial gap), and at high levels it seems to reduce both the degree of belief-change and
of polarization.
Robustness. To check for robustness, I first ran the above simulation with the same
parameters, first for 100 red (favorable-argument) agents and then for 100 blue (disfavorable
argument) agents to get estimates for their mean posteriors. This resulted in an estimate for
the posterior average confidence of favorable-argument agents at 0.663 (with 95% confidence
interval = [0.642, 0.684]), and an estimate for the posterior average confidence of disfavorable-
argument agents at 0.341 (with 95% confidence interval = [0.321, 0.363]).
Obviously the rate and reliability of polarization will vary with key parameters. Thus
the second way we can check for robustness if by varying baseShift and hardenSpeed
systematically. The end of the Robustness subsection of section (2) on Argument models
in the Mathematica notebook does this, finding that as baseShift grows and hardenShift
shrinks, the amount and rate of polarization grows. All simulations resulted in the average
red agent having posterior confidence above the average blue agent.
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C.3 Argument-Scrutiny Models (§5)
This subsection explains how to combine the simple argument-models of §5 with the cognitive-
search models of scrutiny given in §4 to yield argument-scrutiny models. As discussed in
the main text, we begin with an argument-model favoring some claim, and then give the
agent the choice to either scrutinize that argument or not. If she does not, the model re-
mains the same and she updates as in §C.2; if she does scrutinize it—searching for a flaw
in the argument—the scenarios where the argument is bad (B) split into two. In one set of
possibilities (F ) she finds a flaw with the argument; in another (C) there is a flaw but she
doesn’t find it (the search is Completable), and another—namely, the set of worlds where
the argument is good—there is not flaw (N = G).
More precisely, given an argument model as described in §C.2, with a prior π and posterior
P—realized as Pg if the argument is good and Pb if it’s bad—scrutinizing it generates a
cognitive search model with the partition {F,C,N} fixing the posterior P as specified in
§C.1, and the following parameters:
· π(q|F ) = π(q|C) = π(q|B).
(Conditional on there being a flaw—whether or not you find it—the probability that
q is true is the same as it would be if you learned the argument was bad.)
· π(q|N) = π(q|G)
(Conditional on there being no flaw, the probability that q is true is the same as it
would be if you learned the argument was good.)
· If x ∈ C, then Px(C) ≥ Pb(C|¬F )
(If there’s a flaw that you don’t find, your confidence that there is should be at least
as great as it should be if you didn’t scrutinize and updated your beliefs accordingly,
and then conditioned on the claim that you wouldn’t have found a flaw if you had.)
The only subtle constraint is the third one. This ensures that, compared with the original
argument model, not finding a flaw that is indeed there provides no more evidence against
there being a flaw than simply conditioning on not finding one would, in keeping with our
treatment of what happens in N -possibilities in cognitive-search models. When Px(C) =
Pb(C|¬F ), scrutiny adds no additional ambiguity over-and-above that already present in the
argument model; when Px(C) > Pb(C|¬F ), the divergence between Px (for x ∈ C) and Py
for y ∈ N grows, increasing the ambiguity. (This corresponds, intuitively, to how likely you
think it is that you should’ve found a flaw that was there, even if you didn’t.)
To generate such an argument-scrutiny model, we are given an argument-model and must
first extract its parameters—this is what extractArgPars does. The function scrutArg then
uses this function to generate a cognitive-search model meeting the above constraints. It
takes three inputs: the original argument model (frame), the probability of finding a flaw in
the argument if there is one (pFind), and the degree to which scrutiny increases ambiguity
over and above the original argument, i.e. the degree (if at all) to which Px(C) approaches
1, over and above Pb(C|¬F ) (jShift, ranging from 0 to 1).
Given this, we can simulate what happens when both groups are presented with a series
of (different) arguments favoring q, but one group (red) never scrutinizes them, while the
other group (blue) always does. Again, there are a variety of choice-points for how we model
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and constrain this. I used the same parameters for generating arguments that I used in
§C.2 (except this time all agents favored q), and ran four versions of the scrutiny simulation.
Since scrutiny introduces more noise into the simulations, all used 50 agents (to better see
the average trend) and 100 arguments.
In version (1), scrutinizing agents never find a flaw even if there is one (pFind = 0), and
the scrutiny adds no ambiguity (jShift = 0). Such scrutiny does not change the original
argument-model at all, and so agents who scrutinize polarize as much and in the same
direction as those who don’t—as seen in the top left of Figure 9 on page 30.
In version (2), scrutinizing agents always find a flaw if there is one (pFind =1), meaning
that scrutiny removes all ambiguity from the argument. (The jShift parameter has no effect
in this case; I set it to pull uniformly at random from [0, 1].) Since such scrutiny changes
the model to an unambiguous one, by Theorem 2.1, scrutinizing agents do not expectedly
polarize from their priors of 0.5—as seen in the top right of Figure 9 on page 30.
In version (3), scrutinizing agents sometimes find a flaw if there is one (pFind pulled
randomly from [0, 1]), and scrutiny introduces a small degree of ambiguity (jShift pulled
randomly from [0, 0.5]). The result is that agents who scrutinize predictably polarize is the
same direction as those that don’t, but less so—as seen in the bottom left of Figure 9 on
page 30.
In version (4), scrutinizing agents again sometimes find a flaw if there is one (pFind
pulled randomly from [0, 1]), and scrutiny introduces a substantial ambiguity (jShift pulled
randomly from [0, 1]). The result is that agents who scrutinize predictably polarize in the
opposite direction of those that don’t—as seen in the bottom right of Figure 9 on page 30.
Robustness. Recall that pro agents in this simulation are identical to those from the
main simulation of §C.2, meaning we have estimates for their mean posteriors with these
parameters at 0.663, with 95% confidence interval of [0.642, 0.684]. To check that the results
in the above simulations (1)–(4) were robust, I ran the same parameters but with 200 con
agents and calculated estimates and confidence intervals for their posteriors. The results are
as expected.
In version (1), the mean posterior was 0.649, with a 95% confidence interval of [0.636, 0.663],
indicating that scrutinizing agents shift to a comparable degree to those who don’t scrutinize,
as expected. In version (2), the mean posterior was 0.506, with a 95% confidence interval
of [0.473, 0.539], indicating that agents do not predictably shift from their priors of 0.5, as
expected. In version (3), the mean posterior was 0.529, with a 95% confidence interval of
[0.506, 0.553]. As this is well below the confidence interval of [0.642, 0.684] for those who
don’t scrutinize, this confirms our expectation that such scrutiny dampens polarization. In
version (4), the mean posterior was 0.461, with a 95% confidence interval of [0.434, 0.488].
As this is below the initial credences of 0.5, this confirms our expectation that such scrutiny
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